History’s Lesson No 1: learning to say sorry

This gesture was needed to consolidate Bangladesh-Pakistan relations as well as to purge the Pakistani soul of a tragic blot that has, until now, either been denied or explained away. Now if Pakistan also accepts those of its citizens who were left behind in Bangladesh, the so-called Biharis, an important phase in learning from history will have truly begun.

In a nation’s evolution, it is important to continuously review the presumptions that lead to disastrous decisions. General Musharraf first made parts of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report on the East Pakistan tragedy public, three decades after it was written. Now he has addressed the people of Bangladesh and sought their compassion, if not outright forgiveness, for the same sequence of events.

But in doing so he has also created a problem for himself. As contrition replaces denial there is bound to be some debate about the army’s institutional role in Pakistan’s history. And at least some of the conclusions might not be as positive as General Musharraf might desire in his role as a well-intentioned military ruler.

General Yahya—the man who presided over the 1971 tragedy—had assumed power at a time of national crisis, with considerable public support. He had attempted to reform the country’s polity and lay the foundations of democracy guided by him and his uniformed associates.

Personal weaknesses relating to wine and women notwithstanding, he was an able soldier and a financially honest man. His intentions were probably as good as those of other military rulers, but his inability to understand political issues and to deal with them led to military defeat as well as division of Pakistan—the ‘‘whirlwind of unfortunate events’’ that have now been regretted.

Yahya believed that he had been assigned a mission by the Almighty to save Pakistan from ‘‘corrupt’’ politicians. He did not waver for one minute from the ‘strategy’ that he and his fellow generals evolved, ignoring public opinion and the voices of the intelligentsia. The ‘strategy’ turned out to be a recipe for national disaster. The lesson is to acknowledge that the complex problems of a nation such as Pakistan cannot be solved by the simple though straightforward approach of a soldier with a sense of God-given mission.

General Pervez Musharraf would do well to take a deep breath and examine the record of other soldier-rulers who either refused to heed civilian advice or chose the wrong political course. The real message of the East Pakistan tragedy and the conclusions drawn in the Hamoodur Rahman report are to avoid soldierly over-confidence and to make the transition from soldier to ruler with tolerance for civilian opinion. Unless that is done, we could end up once again with the kind of political confusion General Yahya presided over.

A soldier is trained to be courageous and to ignore suggestions that interfere with the brave prescription. A ruler, on the other hand, needs to take into account many factors that may not fit the do-or-die paradigm.

A story is told about General Dwight D. Eisenhower, a military hero who was elected President as the nominee of the Republican Party in 1952, succeeding President Harry Truman. On the day of Eisenhower’s inauguration Truman made remarks to the effect, ‘‘Poor Ike. All his life he has told soldiers ‘Do this, do that’ and his orders have been carried out. Now he’ll do the same from the Oval office and discover that his commands are not always fulfilled’’.

Although Eisenhower managed to get re-elected four years later, his tenure as President was far from successful or brilliant.

Since General Ayub Khan, officers of the Pakistan army have looked down on the country’s civilians. But after every military intervention, Pakistan’s leadership crisis has deepened. Most soldier-rulers have learnt the hard way that the profession of soldiering provides insufficient training for the task of governance.

If General Pervez Musharraf’s attempt at reconstructing Pakistani politics and society is to succeed, it must begin with an acknowledgement of the limitations of the armed forces as an agent of change. By his comments in Bangladesh, General Musharraf has acknowledged the failing of his predecessors. Perhaps it is also time for him to review his institution’s contempt for all civilians and politicians. The real mistake committed in East Pakistan was the refusal of some to recognise that the will of the people is supreme. If a lesson has truly been learnt from 1971, the people of present-day Pakistan should be allowed to choose their leaders without the sword of disqualification or military action hanging over their heads.

Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He has served as adviser to Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Ambassador to Sri Lanka