HAuLed up

So strong is the indictment that HAL chairman N R Mohanty has agreed, for the first time ever, to post Russian expert ‘‘audit teams’’ at HAL sites (Lucknow, Koraput, Nashik) to ensure better quality control in engine repair and overhaul. The first team is expected this month.

Since the IAF probe began, it has lost six more aircraft due to ‘‘technical defects,’’ all maintained and overhauled by HAL. In fact, of the 315 MiG-21s lost over the last 30 years, 118 were due to ‘‘technical defects’’.

When contacted, the IAF spokesperson declined to comment on the exchanges with HAL. But its conclusion that HAL’s quality control ‘‘shook our confidence,’’ is based not only on its own probe but also investigation done by a team of experts specially flown in from RAC-MiG in Russia, the original manufacturers.

Consider the sequence of events:

• On November 25, 2002, Air Headquarters wrote to Mohanty saying its findings ‘‘shook our confidence in the quality control at HAL.’’

Both the September 9 crashes, the letter said, were due to ‘‘flame-out’’ (sudden seizure) in the engine because of faults found in the Rotary Slide Valve (RSV), the critical component that regulates how much fuel reaches the MiG’s engine.

Traces of silica, sodium, calcium, aluminium had jammed the valve causing the accident—metals not from the valve’s material. In other words, these impurities sneaked in during cleaning or installation.

• Air Headquarters then sent a team of two officers to HAL divisions in Koraput and Lucknow where the MiG engines are assembled. Based on the team’s feedback, HAL was told that ‘‘a lot needs to be done to improve (its) environment and technical practices.’’

And that actions was required “on a war footing to improve deficiency areas…improve the level of awareness at the shop-floor level personnel.’’ • On February 25, 2003, Air Headquarters sent a second letter suggesting that a dedicated team of specialists from all HAL divisions—Lucknow, Koraput, Nashik—‘‘carry out a study to resolve the issue of the (valve) RSV seizure.’’

• In April, Air Headquarters got a team of Russian specialists from RAC-MiG, the original manufacturers, to fly down and visit the HAL division in Koraput as well as the Air Force station in Ambala to investigate the causes of engine seizure.

• Based on the Russians’ findings, another letter, dated June 18, 2003, was sent to HAL. In this the indictment was sweeping: 70% of the cases of engine seizure were barely within hours of overhaul; fuel system was contaminated, specified design and technology parameters were being violated. (see box)

It was this that prompted Air Headquarters to suggest to HAL that a ‘‘Russian audit team (be posted) at the work sites’’ to improve the quality control process.

And on July 10, 2003, HAL chief Mohanty wrote back to Air Headquarters acknowledging that the problem of valve seizure had been viewed with ‘‘serious concern’’ and a ‘‘number of initiatives’’ taken in areas of ‘‘over haul and testing and better fuel management.’’

According to his letter—Mohanty was unavailable for comment—HAL took several other steps: training of technical personnel, proper flushing of the engines, daily check of fuel cleanliness and internal audits of the respective divisions.

He also agreed with Air Headquarters’ suggestions to post a Russian team of specialists from RAC-MiG and INKAR, the original manufacturers of the engine’s fuel pump, in India.

On the problem of lack of cleanliness in the engines, which had proved fatal for the aircraft would be addressed, ‘‘as suggested in the (Russian) report’’ and ‘‘units in the assembly line will be checked for cleanliness again after’’ the engines were flushed.