The operation by Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) to flush out terrorist groups from Bhutan was effective enough to make a dent on the numbers of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front for Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO). Of them, the ULFA particularly had for long been an absolute menace in Assam and the Northeast as well as in Bhutan, motivating other groups to join the ISI network which is as active as ever, despite the India-Pakistan peace process.
The demoralisation following RBA’s offensive has resulted in some ULFA leaders even landing up at the Sino-Bhutan border and requesting Chinese sanctuary. They were turned away and are clearly on the run. The pressure, however, will have to be maintained relentlessly as there are some more menacing moves on. According to a recent report in the South Asia Intelligence Review, headed by K.P.S. Gill, Nepalese Maoist insurgents have been establishing links with a melange of Indian left-wing extremist groups, including the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and at least two Northeast insurgent groups — the ULFA and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). Such subversive activity has once again brought India-Nepal border management practices under scrutiny. Increasing counter-insurgency operations by Nepal since the breakdown of the ceasefire last August, have also led to an influx of Maoist insurgents into areas bordering India. Whenever the Nepalese security forces up the ante, Maoist cadres sneak across the porous border in search of safe havens.
The India-Nepal ‘open border’ is unique in that people can cross it from any point, although there are specific border checkposts as well. The porous 1,800 kilometre-long border, which has been maintained according to the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, offers uninterrupted passage for illegal smuggling of goods, arms, ammunition and narcotics, as well as human trafficking from either side.
Though some efforts have continued to check the intrusion of subversive elements, they have had little impact at the ground level. The problem is compounded by the fact that both countries have weak, indeed, virtually non-existent, national identity and documentation systems. These movements constitute grave risks to security, not just for Nepal but India, as Maoists develop links not only with ideologically sympathetic groups here but with a number of other subversive groups on a purely opportunistic basis.
While India has been primarily concentrating on securing its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh, its open border with Nepal is now posing a danger. It is therefore imperative that the existing border management practices are reviewed in the light of the changed dynamics of insurgency within Nepal, as well as to maintain a ‘terror free’ border between the two countries.