Fly over this divide

It is therefore obvious that if operational readiness and efficiency of the Air Force are likely to be affected by the exit of pilots, then the CAS will not approve it. It is also his responsibility to manage the Air Force in a way that results in its personnel being proud and happy to serve the institution. I know that a very large number IAF personnel are happy to stay in the Air Force, and not because they are paid well! Serving in the Air Force is a profession but some may see it as a “government job” that signifies permanency, promotions and pension. Regrettably, over the years, the trend of pushing retirement age higher and the dilution of ranks reflect a push towards making military service a government job.

If the Air Force is to function efficiently, certain canons of the private sector need to be adopted. Costs of manpower and infrastructure have increased alarmingly, leaving less and less for modernisation and operations. The IAF conducted a nation-wide study on what the younger generation thought of this institution. It revealed that the youth are willing to work very hard but expect fast upward mobility. They desire freedom to switch jobs if something better turns up. Most do not want to be locked-in “permanently” in the Air Force. This matches well the trend in the West. The minimum period of engagement in western air forces is about five years — not more than 40-45 per cent of personnel wish to continue in service after this minimum period.

If a pilot serves in the IAF for about 10 years he would have made good the expenditure incurred on his training and would have established his professional standard. Therefore such pilots should be permitted to leave the Air Force provided they can be spared. Filling “cockpit vacancies” and maintaining a reserve is most vital. Currently, we have the example of Air Traffic Control officers of the IAF working with civil aviation on deputation. But pilots are never deputed to the civil sector. In this regard, not too long ago, I had held discussions with the chairman of Air-India along with the senior management of both organisations. The IAF was not prepared to shed a large number of pilots at one go. The Air Force proposed sending every year a certain number of pilots with about five years of flying experience on deputation for a five- to ten-year-period. To support such a programme over a long term, Air-India was requested to consider funding procurement of a few twin-engine aircraft, like the DO-228, to augment the IAF’s training assets. Given this, it was felt that the capacity of training pilots by the Air Force could be expanded. However, nothing further happened.

Indira Gandhi Udan Academy looms big when we discuss training of pilots. The civil aviation ministry created this academy with great fanfare for the sole purpose of training pilots for civil aviation. I understand it is in a poor state, lacking quality management and infrastructure. It would serve India better if the IAF takes over this institution. In fact, training of pilots for military and civil could be integrated under the Air Force as a comprehensive programme, which would save costs and increase efficiency. After all, the Air Force also belongs to the people. Why shouldn’t taxpayers’ money be better spent?

Over the years, a great divide has been brought about between the military and civil aviation establishments. The assets and inventory of the Air Force is far bigger than those of civil aviation. Yet, a “licence raj” operates in the civil sector. IAF personnel, irrespective of their experience, do not hold the licence to work on or operate civil aircraft. The Air Force feels this is a harassment because it is not easy to acquire a civil licence. This is a complex subject but, fundamentally, civil and military aviation operate in watertight compartments instead of being complementary. The Air Force’s training, engineering and operational infrastructure are far superior to those that exist in the civil sector. There is no structure in the country to promote interaction among aviation professionals and institutions in order to promote national interest. Instead, consultants are frequently employed at considerable cost with no gains to institutions.

When I took over as president of the Aeronautical Society of India in 2004, I called for establishing a national aeronautics policy that was initiated in ’94 by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, when he was the president of the Society. The intention was to address the development of aeronautics and expertise without upsetting the existing organisational structures. It went all the way up to the prime minister. Upon his direction, J.N. Dixit, then national security adviser (NSA), chaired a few sessions on how to achieve this best. The NSA, after examination, felt that an aeronautics commission could be considered, which will be headed by the NSA and function under the minister of defence. In December ’04, at the Combined Commanders Conference of the ministry of defence, the PM stated that the government would establish a Maritime Commission and an Aeronautics Commission. Most regrettably, Dixit passed away and since then nothing much seems to have moved.

Bureaucracy is not capable of solving complex technical and management issues. India does not have the luxury to dilute and waste valuable assets which — whether they are military or civil — belong to the public.

The writer is a former chief of air staff