A brutally frank document circulating in Army headquarters says its troops are unfit for counter-insurgency warfare. That conclusion ought not to surprise the select band of senior army commanders to whom the report has been sent for study and action. From the Kashmir front to the Northeast there have been far too many examples of the shortcomings of the country's counter-insurgency (CI) operations run by the army as well as a number of paramilitary forces. All will welcome the fact, therefore, that there is no more pussy-footing over the issue and that HQs is prepared to call a spade a spade. Things can improve only when internal weaknesses and their causes are honestly acknowledged. A good beginning has been made.Implicit in the exercise is the understanding that the army will go on being used for CI operations. This is significant. It has frequently been argued by security specialists that the paramilitary forces should bear the main responsibility for CI and that the army is presently overburdened and overstretched with such duties. Minister of Defence George Fernandes, stressing the costs of CI operations, has made no secret of his desire to reduce the army's role in internal security and especially CI. The policy lacuna here is a major contributor to the low level of efficiency of CI forces. For a clear policy to emerge will take time. For the present, given the demand for a high level of CI effectiveness, given also a standing army of a million and a quarter men and women, there can be no case for an immediate reduction in the army's CI role. Even as the search for political solutions continues, there is no alternative to the army continuing to be the lynchpin of CI operations in Kashmir and the NE.Pragmatism dictates getting the facts of the army's strengths and weaknesses straight and then getting on with improving capabilities. It is important for Army HQs to concentrate on the basics of building effective counter-terrorist, counter-insurgency units rather than be preoccupied only with command and control functions. The need for a unified command of army, paramilitary and police forces for CI warfare in Kashmir has been much bruited about in recent years and has emerged to some extent. Coherent leadership is essential. But it is one of several areas needing special attention. As the internal report suggests, there is much to be done to improve the physical and psychological fitness of troops. Fatigue and corruption are sapping their strength and morale. The Kargil committee report recommended better equipment and training. Over all, it would seem, the army needs to look for more specialisation, more speed and mobility and better firepower. It needs to reorganise its intelligence and communicationsfunctions. There has been some work on specialisation and restructuring for fighting low intensity wars. The Rashtriya Rifles, set up a few years ago, was a major step in that direction but did not go far enough. To find the answer to why the army is unable to recruit more young officers, what has to be examined, among other things, is the army's system of rewards, opportunities and responsibilities. That also means dealing with the perception that political skills are more useful for officers than professional qualities.
