Expansion of Security Council — No cause for celebration

The State Department’s announcement comes just two months before the next session of the UN General Assembly, and in the wake of Secretary General Kofi Annan’s suggestions for reforming the UN. It is logical to anticipate that the US would have UN reforms on its operational agenda for the next annual UN General Assembly session. It may also advocate the immediate induction of Japan and Germany, saying it is already willing to give three more seats to developing countries as soon as there is a consensus on which ones should represent Asia, Africa and South America.

Though an expanded permanent membership of the Security Council has been a matter of continuous discussion, some questions merit repetition. Is expansion of the general and permanent membership of the Security Council necessary? If so, what should be the criteria for designating countries? What are the criteria articulated or hinted at by the influential powers in the UN? If the veto remains restricted to the present five permanent members, is there any point in nominating additional permanent members? What are India’s prospects and, more importantly, would vital Indian interests be served by permanent membership without a veto?

Several working groups have discussed the first four questions; a number of suggestions are in circulation. No definitive set of recommendations has emerged so far. Only one point is clear. Any proposal for Security Council expansion will succeed only if it is endorsed by the US.

That Security Council membership should be expanded is axiomatic. The UN has 185 member states today, compared to 52 at the time of its establishment. The five permanent members were the major Allies who defeated the Axis. China was included notionally as part of the victorious Alliance, but more importantly because of Chiang Kai Shek’s close relations with the US. The UK, France and Russia account for only about 8 per cent of world population whereas Asia, with nearly 60 per cent, has only one permanent member, China. Africa with 13 per cent and South America with 10-11 per cent have no permanent representation. If the US suggestion of inducting Germany and Japan went through, Asia would have two permanent representatives, whereas Europe with less than 9 per cent of world population would have four. The normative conclusion, therefore, should be that both the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council should be expanded.Secondly, there should be proportionate representation in the Security Council’s permanent seats on the basis of demography. If this logic is found acceptable, China, India, Japan and Indonesia should get permanent seats taking into account their population, resources, technological capacities and potentiality for political influence. Europe should have three members at most and the UK should certainly relinquish its permanent membership. Africa should be represented on the permanent membership by Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. South and Central America should be represented by Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, North America by the US. To give proper representation to areas without permanent membership, there should be 14 non-permanent members.

The Security Council should have 25 members, 11 permanent and 14 non-permanent. Permanent membership would have to be expanded by six seats and non-permanent by four. The tenure of non-permanent members should be increased to three years to provide continuity. This arrangement would fulfil the criteria for demographic and regional representation and be an appropriate reflection of technological and economic capacities. One quite realises that this is a purely theoretical proposition which would not be acceptable to the powers-that-be.

The actual criteria being advocated are quite different. They are: first, political acceptability for the Western powers led by the US. Second, political, economic and social conformity with the new world order which the US and its allies are structuring. Third, military power, specially nuclear and strategic capacities, economic resources and reliability as a political ally of the West. Fourth, the capacity to financially support UN activities.To answer the question about denying the veto to new permanent members is simple: either the veto should be abolished or given to all permanent members of the expanded Council. Permanent membership without the veto, while the five older permanent members retain this power, would make the exercise a cosmetic gesture. It would in no way make the Security Council more representative nor strengthen the UN.

If one takes into account the criteria on the basis of which the US is advocating expansion, India’s prospects for permanent membership are very limited, because:

(a) It is unlikely that we would be the consensus choice of the Asian region. (b) India cannot conform to the politico-strategic agenda of the new world order being stipulated by the US in terms of nuclear non-proliferation, space technology, disarmament and arms control. (c) We do not fall in the category of reliable political partners of the West in their judgment. (d) Our financial capacity to contribute to the UN is much less than Japan, Germany or ASEAN countries collectively. (e) Even if we overcome these hurdles and manage permanent membership, without the veto it in no way enhances our clout to influence the UN’s working or to safeguard India’s interests on which UN activities may impinge.

There is no reason for us to get euphoric about the latest offer of three permanent seats to developing countries. We should avoid the type of debacle we faced when we lost to Japan the contest for a Security Council seat in 1996. Our endeavour should be to create a consensus among the UN’s general membership and a cohesive strategy to ensure that the more objective and normative criteria become the basis for expansion rather than political criteria based on the chemistry of power equations.