Whether or not empires are essential for world peace and prosperity, contemplating their power and potential for good gives many intellectuals a vicarious and macho thrill. In Praise of Empires is the equivalent of an intellectual whiplash in favour of empires. The argument is simple: there is little peace and even less progress unless an empire stabilises world order. This is true of all history, not just the present. Empires secure stability, promote the dissemination of knowledge, provide a framework for beneficial trade and kick slumbering peoples up the path of progress. Anyone who denies this is simply guilty of week-kneed, muddly and sentimental thinking.
For Lal the question is not whether the world needs an empire. The question is: what kind of an empire? His answer is an empire that promotes gentlemanly capitalism and secures an international liberal economic order. He worries that the US will abdicate the responsibilities thrust upon it by pressures from two different sorts of moralisms. On the one hand the American people will refuse to recognise what they actually are: an imperial power. They will not bear the costs of what it takes to be an empire and hence leave the future of the world in peril. On the other hand those Americans, like the neo-cons, who finally accept America’s imperial destiny, will promote the wrong kind of empire. They will look for deep moral justifications like the promotion of democracy or westernisation of the world.
But these objectives are mistaken. Democracy cannot be easily transplanted and ranks far behind the economic liberty and the rule of law in the scale of values. Westernisation only produces cultural resentment in turn. Empire ought only to have a much narrower and clearer objective, the promotion of an international liberal economic order. Even an empire in the service of this cause will require a generosity from the United States that does not seem anywhere on the horizon. The one area where the US needs to be unilateralist is in giving economic concessions to the rest of the world. Rather than insisting on reciprocity, the US should simply open up its markets. Over time, these measures will help strengthen a global economic order. If the US does not do it, we will alas have to await a power of the future to do it. China and India are the two obvious candidates.
And the relevant comparison in claiming that empire was beneficial ought not to rest on the fallacy of comparing growth rates after empire with growth rates before it (a comparison that anyway does not substantiate Lal’s argument as much as he thinks it does). The relevant question is whether alternative modes of globalisation, like diffusion of technology and emulation would have achieved better or worse results during the same period. The book often has sweeping and interesting judgments, like the fact that the UN is dead and the IMF should be killed of. But its core politics is self contradictory. It wants to defend a minimal state, but does not remark on the fact that imperialism leads to the most extraordinary expansion of domestic state power, and imperiling of liberties as the experience of every empire has shown.
Liberals should guard against the pathologies of power, not be allured by the machismo of empire.