Doublespeak by Cong hurt us: Jaswant

In an interview to The Indian Express yesterday, Talbott had stated that the US made several ‘‘representations’’ to New Delhi, including a call from then President Clinton to Rao, saying that if he tested it would have an impact on the bilateral relationship.

Singh also denied the Rao government had ever taken the BJP or then Leader of the Opposition A B Vajpayee into confidence over why he backed off. ‘‘To the best of my knowledge that did not happen,’’ he said.

But he pointed out that ‘‘the policy of implicit nuclearisation that successive Congress and other governments pursued clandestinely, whilst simultaneously asserting a contrary viewpoint in public…was damaging to the nation’s interest.’’

Firstly, he said, it prevented India from becoming a nuclear weapons power, even by the mid-60s. Secondly, ‘‘we continued to suffer the damage of asserting publicly a policy that lacked our own convictions,’’ Singh added.

Asked about the content and spirit of the Indo-US strategic dialogue that is the subject matter of Talbott’s book called Engaging India that will hit the stands in a few months, Singh said he could not talk about those years.

‘‘I haven’t seen the book…I’ve worked with Strobe for several years and have the highest regard for his integrity and competence…I have no reason to doubt what he said,’’ he said.

But while Singh refused to discuss the rationale of Rao’s alleged decision in December 1995, professor of international relations at JNU, C. Raja Mohan said the Rao government had over 1994-95 asked both the Ministry of External Affairs and the Finance Ministry for an ‘‘assessment of costs and consequences’’ if India were to go nuclear.

‘‘The recommendation from both was that the costs would be too high and that they would derail India’s economic reforms,’’ Raja Mohan said, pointing out that if Rao had indeed taken the plunge in 1995, when both France and China had tested in the same year, fewer fingers would have pointed at India.

Through the early 90s, he said, as India debated whether it should test or not, the ‘‘choice really amounted to whether you take the risk of defying the US or avoid that risk.’’ Rao refused to take that risk and paid a political price for it, Raja Mohan added, while Vajpayee understood ‘‘that the costs would be temporary, the US would not be able to isolate large democracies like India and eventually come to terms with India’s decision. Vajpayee took the risk and became the beneficiary,’’ he said.