Manipur has a history of high degree of political instability and mis-governance, even compared to the rest of the North-East, combined with widespread deprivation and frustration. Each community—the Meiteis, the Nagas and the Kukis—has their own complaints. Similarly, Manipur has an abundance of emotive issues that local politicians can manipulate. Those who are unaware of these deep rooted grievances are ill-suited to handle the current tense situation. Distorted vision and lack of understanding in the last decade has added to Manipur’s misery. Peace talks with the NSCN(I-M) without a political framework, left entirely to bureaucratic and Intelligence officers, has made the issue of territorial integrity another controversial issue. The obsession with Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) has become a handy tool for politicians, civil groups and for Meitei extremists who want to exploit public sentiment and add to divisions among communities. It has sidetracked real issues of governance and development. For state politicians, such ploys are handy to cover up their failings. Manipur’s economy is crippled, unemployment has increased, lack of water, electricity health care and HIV/AIDS epidemic have added to anger and alienation. The tragic death of Manorama at the hands of Assam Rifles on July 11 justifiably adds to peoples’ anger and revives past ghosts of Heirangoithong, RMC (Regional Medical College) and Malom shootouts, with Irom Sharmila fasting since 2000. Similarly, in the hills, ghosts of Oinam and Sajouba lie buried to be revived to exploit public anger. Justice must be done in Manorama’s case and truth made public at the earliest. Governance and real issues of public interest can no longer be wished away, as it will only add to anger and frustration. Turning to the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), is the law itself defective or is its application and management at fault? The law has been operative since 1980. Admittedly, at the height of Meitei insurgency, there were aberrations and some violent ones but these were few in number. It is a similar story in the hill areas affected by the Naga insurgency. The reason for this was strict monitoring and institutional mechanisms established by the Army itself, so that it stood forth as transparent and easily accessible to the public. A public liaison cell was established in ‘M’ Sector Headquarters, where anyone was free to walk in and enquire about arrests and status of those incarcerated. Those arrested but found innocent were released to the Meira Paibis or other social organisations in police presence (a permanent police officer was present at ‘M’ Sector), similar was the case in the hills where village authorities were co-opted. All those suspected of being UG (underground) activists or their helpers were handed over to the police within reasonable time as the law demanded. Interrogations were carried out at designated centres at formation level and in remote areas even at unit level. The AFSPA, like POTA, is as good or bad as the manner of its application and institutional safeguards within the police, paramilitary forces or Army. Security forces are part of the establishment and they cannot be left alone to handle situations, with no action whatsoever being taken on the part of other instruments of state. The Army acts best and most efficiently when it is supported by the civilian structure; it cannot be expected to accomplish tasks far beyond its own capabilities. The insurgency environment in the entire North-East has changed. In Manipur, it is a criminalised industry run by a nexus of politicians, insurgents and bureaucrats, with the state providing the capital, which is shared around for mutual benefit and to perpetuate the same power structure. Similarly, insurgent factions and politicians are hand in glove to ferment ethnic conflicts and exploit public anger. You cannot expect the Army to fight insurgency on the ground, yet leave the nexus that feeds it untouched. In the recent situation, both the Governor and Chief Minister were absent from Manipur and away in Delhi, leaving nobody to interact with the agitators or take strong action to defuse the situation. Very cleverly, Chief Minister Ibobi Singh, like some of his predecessors, joined his voice to populist sentiments and threatened to pass a resolution against the AFSPA, thus confronting the Centre with a full-blown crisis. Is this not a case of the civilian state abdicating its responsibility? It is absolutely correct for the Centre to insist that the AFSPA will stay but now, what about putting in place mechanisms for safeguards against its misuse? The Central Government’s consultations with all constituents of the UPA, the Opposition and the establishment of a committee on Manipur are a typically bureaucratic reflex reaction, it is a political short-cut. Politicians bungle and then expect the Army to sort out the subsequent mess, at the same time refusing to provide the armed forces with the support of effective social and political structures. While Manipur burns, the experts gather in yet another dialogue of the deaf. Lt Gen Nayar (retd) served in the North-East, and is also former governor of Manipur and Nagaland
