The earlier distinction made between militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir and those active in the Northeast, the former being termed as terrorists and the latter as insurgents, does not hold any longer. While the “tanzeems” in Jammu and Kashmir and the “Khalistanis” were recruited, trained, inducted and continue to be directed by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), in the Northeast the ISI made an effective entry in 1990, thanks entirely to the United Liberation Front of Asom’s top leadership who escaped to Bangladesh when the army launched operations against them for the first time, making a mockery of the very cause of the anti-foreigner agitation in Assam, which was its launching-pad. It was only a matter of time before the ISI, through ULFA, developed ties with other insurgent groups in the Northeast. While ULFA always had Pol Pot-ish tendencies (remember the mass graves in Lakhipathar and Saraiphung forests as well as their style of killing defenceless people), the other groups at least began with some ideology or the other which emerged from feelings of neglect and alienation. But since the 1990s the process of degeneration, of using ideology as a cover for purely criminal acts, has gathered pace, as can be gauged from recent incidents particularly in Assam and Manipur. In Assam, ULFA specialised in abduction and murder, or both. Killings were the next step whenever an attempt at extortion was unsuccessful. In Manipur, Meitei and Kuki groups began resorting to abductions for ransom quite recently. Ten incidents in Manipur since December 2002, mentioned in the South Asia Intelligence Report of November 2003, are an indication of how bad the situation is in the state. On December 9, 2002, the youngest son of Rishang Keishing, former chief minister of Manipur, was kidnapped by the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) and released two days later after reportedly extracting a hefty ransom. A deputy manager with a telecommunications company too was abducted by the KLA and released 23 days later after an unspecified sum of money was paid. Similarly a representative of a German NGO was kidnapped in March 2003, again by the KLA, for a ransom rumoured to be in the region of Rs 1 crore, but he was released in April, after great public pressure. A businessman was abd- ucted by the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) in April 2003 and was killed as he refused to pay up. The general manager of the Agricultural and Processed Food Export Development Authority, abducted by the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) in April, was lucky to escape in nine days. A general manager with the Integrated Cooperative Development Programme, kidnapped by the United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) in October, was released nine days later. Then came the most heinous incident, the kidnapping of the eight-year-old daughter of Francis Ngajokpa, a minister in the Manipur government, for a ransom believed to be in the region of Rs 10 lakhs. But the girl was killed nonetheless. People, cutting across tribes and communities, requested, protested and even formed search parties, only to find the little girl’s abandoned body. In recent weeks a linguistic twist has been sought to be given to the activities of militant groups. ULFA, after announcing a ban on Hindi films and intimidating tea garden owners and labour, used the recent incident of Bihari candidates appearing for the Railways examination in Guwahati to ignite a communal bloodbath. Meanwhile, in the Karbi Anglong area, the Kuki Revolutionary Army and the United People’s Democratic Front have been indulging in kidnappings and killings. For days now the situation has been extremely tense, and it will take careful handling by the administration to restore normalcy. There is ample evidence of the ISI’s role in fomenting trouble in the northeastern states from neighbouring Bangladesh, where its presence has been considerably fortified since the Bangladesh National Party came to power. One of its major objectives for militant groups in the region is to create conflict with communal overtones. It seems that after more than a decade of working overtime, the ISI has succeeded in converting ideological insurgents into terrorists.
