The Bill Clinton-Boris Yeltsin summit at the Kremlin had a definite end-of-chapter feel to it. The predominant image was of two diminished leaders waiting for time to run out as they went through the formalities of the pow-wow. The desperately earnest business-as-usual approach gave some of the major items on the agenda a phantom quality like sounds in an echo-chamber. One such topic raised by the American President was Russian military cooperation with India. This is as surreal as the rest of the arms control discussion on a START-III treaty, reductions of nuclear material stockpiles and an exchange of information on anti-missile alert systems. For a Russian government which is not actually in control of anything in the country at this point in time all this is likely to go in one ear and out of the other. It is instructive nevertheless to find Clinton bringing up the issue of Indo-Russian military cooperation even though he cannot really have any hope of persuading Russia's present or future leaders tohalt military sales to India.For one thing, it will take more than a word in the Russian ear at a time of crisis to scuttle a decades-old arrangement which is of mutual benefit to India and Russia. Second, it is sheer hypocrisy for one of the world's leading armaments suppliers to argue that arms races are fuelled by arms sales. Were Washington and other advanced economies as virtuous as they would like others to be, most of the wars and insurgencies of this century would never have occurred. All this being obvious, why plough into the India-Russia military relationship? One reason could be commercial. Restricted by domestic law from selling any more conventional arms to India and Pakistan, Washington may be trying to close those markets to others as well. While this may be true in a general sense, what the futility of the effort shows is the bankruptcy of ideas in Washington in the post-Pokharan period.Although the Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks may be making progress, in essence the Clintonadministration's assessment of the situation in South Asia remains in September what it was in May. It sees the region as a potential nuclear hot spot and fears it will be sucked into the trouble. In short, Washington has moved no nearer towards accepting the reality of the nuclear weapons status of India and Pakistan and proceeding from there. It still seems to believe the clock can be turned back. Clearly many more months of US-India talks will be needed to alter Clinton's fixed ideas. It does not help that India and Pakistan are conducting a dialogue of the deaf and that the political and economic situation in Pakistan appears to be spinning out of control. The belligerent noises across the LOC will be understood in India as noises. But those like Washington who have made up their minds that New Delhi and Islamabad are unable to manage their relationship responsibly will choose to believe their dark forebodings are justified.
