While in Lahore a few days ago, I picked up a book, We’ve Learnt Nothing From History, by Mohammad Asghar Khan, first commander-in-chief of Pakistan’s Air Force. I met him in his political incarnation; he was the founder of Tehrik-e-Istaqlal. This was the time when former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had been sentenced to death. I requested Asghar Khan to issue an appeal for the release of Bhutto. My argument was — the same point I had earlier made to Wali Khan from the Northwest Frontier Province — that Bhutto should be fought politically. If the military finished him, it would set a ruinous precedent and also hit democracy beyond repair. Both Wali Khan and Asghar Khan had suffered at the hands Bhutto so much that they had no sympathy for him. Wali Khan told me that Bhutto had arranged a murderous attack on him. Both said that a person like Bhutto could be destroyed only by the military, no one else. Finally, it happened that way. For the first time, the military rulers hanged an elected prime minister, thus establishing a dangerous precedent. I was unfortunately proved right. Democracy in Pakistan suffered a fatal blow.I have gone through Asghar Khan’s book to find out if he has explained why he did not appeal for Bhutto’s release. All that he has written in the book is that President Zia-ul Haq did not want to hang Bhutto originally but ultimately took the decision to do so. This is not correct. When I met Zia soon after the coup, he described to me at length how Bhutto had tried to prevail upon him that they could rule together — ‘‘my brain and your brawn,’’ as Zia put it. It was as if only one of two could survive. Obviously, Bhutto was eliminated.What changed Zia’s mind, Asghar Khan says, was a series of happenings between July 15 and the end of August 1977: the reception that Bhutto received on arrival at Lahore in August 1977; the advice of the junta who were not prepared to take the risk of Bhutto winning the election, the pleadings of some Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) leaders that Bhutto should be tried and the elections postponed; the provisions of the 1973 constitution which laid down the death penalty for abrogation of the constitution; and finally Zia-ul Haq’s inbred distrust of politicians. All this may well be true. But what ultimately weighed with Zia, I believe, was the fear that if he let off Bhutto, he would try him (Zia) one day. Zia was saving his own neck.As for the state of democracy, I believe that politicians in Pakistan are primarily responsible for its eclipse. The men in khaki and those in grey suits (bureaucrats) have been in league with each other to perpetuate their stranglehold on the administration. Politicians have weakened themselves by fighting one another for power and the military has exploited the situation to pit one against the other. Still, had General Pervez Musharraf discarded the uniform as he had promised, he would have ignited hopes that military rule was on its way out.Yet, I am sorry to infer that the Pakistanis have reconciled to military rule. I do not see any genuine challenge to it, although the armed forces are very unpopular. As a people, the Pakistanis are similar to the Indians. But the latter were brave enough to throw out Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian regime within 19 months of her imposing the Emergency in June 1975. It may be that Pakistan has not gone through the independence struggle as India has. Or that the Muslim League has not suffered or made sacrifices the way the then Congress party did. Whatever the reasons, the fact is that the people in India, however dispersed, have established a democratic system in which the military has no role. It exists only for the country’s defence.It is apparent that Pakistan cannot have democracy so long as a person in uniform heads the country. Even otherwise, I do not see Pakistan becoming as democratic as even Bangladesh. My several visits to Pakistan have convinced me that a Turkey-like structure may come to be acceptable in that country some day — the army, air force and navy chiefs sitting with the prime minister and some of his colleagues in a top ruling council. This is tragic but unfortunately true.Asghar Khan’s observations on Kashmir are realistic. ‘‘Whatever the moral strength of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue,’’ he says, ‘‘it is not realistic to expect India to walk out of occupied Kashmir. The facade of a secular India would thus be exposed, which India fears will lead to a strengthening of the centrifugal forces in different parts of the country. A settlement on Pakistan’s terms, therefore, is unlikely. for another fifty to hundred years. The chances are that before the end of this period, the two nuclear powers with a common border will destroy themselves in a senseless nuclear holocaust, the likes of which the world has not yet seen. Even if this did not happen, the population explosion alone would impose a burden on the economy of both the countries which they cannot bear when they are spending their meagre resources on non-productive expenditure.’’Asghar Khan describes how Pakistani democracy degenerated into mere electoralism and how a new crop of leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, played musical chairs in Islamabad with disastrous consequences for state and society. As national values declined, cynicism spread like cancer. He believes that the real issues of a developing country must be addressed without the politics of rhetoric. Humanitarianism, social justice and democracy are the crux of his political philosophy. He is still optimistic about Pakistan becoming a tolerant, modern society. If people do not stand up for their ideals and do not voice them as and when they can, who can safeguard a society’s freedoms? In many ways, this applies to India as well, although we are a democratic, secular polity.
