Defence budget: Whither modernisation

Thirdly, compared to the early 1990s, the government has had more funds at its disposal for defence modernisation than at any time in the past two decades. The Russian defence debt is also to be retired soon increasing potential resources.

The challenge ahead, therefore, is to spend wisely on modernisation, and do it efficiently.

Unfortunately, for the last two consecutive years we have witnessed the inability of the government to even spend what it has budgeted for, with shortages in modernisation expenditure being as much as 12 per cent less than the approved budget.

One can only hope that no hat trick takes place! On the other hand, the media reports of India spending $100 billion in arms purchases in the next decade are grossly exaggerated. Simple calculation would show that we couldn’t be spending $10 billion a year on major arms procurement in a budget of $13 billion!

But what everyone needs to note is the global trend in military force modernisation where air power (both in quality and quantity) is at the highest priority now for more than a decade, with naval and land forces modernisation following in that order.

The basic problem with our modernisation decision-making is that the budget structure does not even tell anyone (including the defence establishment) of the funding for force modernisation. Capital expenditure does not automatically translate into modernisation.

While procurement reforms have been long overdue, they by themselves are not going to solve the problem. The roots of the problem perhaps go back to the concept of ‘‘committed’’ bureaucracy and the Shah Commission where ‘‘accountability’’ zeal resulted in the need to protect reputations and slowed down even normal decision-making.

We must face up to the reality that anyone associated with acquisition decision making is adversely affected by a set of inhibitions: the ‘‘Bofors syndrome’’, the Tehelka concerns, and so on.

Unless defence procurement is insulated from politicisation and an assumption that everyone is making money in everything, force modernisation will keep suffering, leading actually to higher costs to the nation.

In fact the CVC’s verdict of clearing all but 10 cases (which require further scrutiny) out of the 1,200 procurement cases pertaining to the period since 1989 referred to him by the Defence Minister should be a source of confidence. Greater regular detailed consultations between the Ministry of Defence and the parliamentary committees would help.

Three issues would still require further attention. While it is inevitable that major weapons systems would attract the greatest attention in modernisation, we need to radically enhance the modernisation of personal weapons, equipment and facilities (especially accommodation, children’s education etc.) for our combatants.

They are the cutting edge of military capability, and must be treated as the elite. Unfortunately, while we rate as one of the most professional militaries in the world, the equipment and facilities for our jawans lag behind even a second-rate military.

Secondly, our defence capability has suffered heavily in the past due to frequent changes in plans. For example, the decision to build submarines (on the experience of having constructed some of the same type) in 1997 was given up in favour of a different source soon after the change in government!

Thirdly, we simply must move toward a broader and deeper collaborative design and development paradigm if we are to ensure that huge funds for modernisation are mostly spent in the country itself rather than drain the earnings of civilian exports.

We have lost more than a decade in not developing such arrangements with a more than willing and capable former Soviet Union. Let us not loose any more, especially when the West is also willing for the same for their own reasons.