Controlling the nuclear genie

Meanwhile it is vital that as long as nuclear weapons exist, and we have them, we must get the strategy for their possible use right. And this requires controlling the nuclear genie. The announcement of the official nuclear doctrine, therefore, is of crucial importance, even more than the details of the structures and institutions to apply the strategy flowing from that doctrine.

The central question that has existed, and will exist in future, is why should we adopt a ‘no-first-use’ doctrine? We must face the unthinkable squarely: after all, are we going to wait for nuclear bombs to be dropped on our country before we launch our own?

To get answers to these, and many other questions, we must be clear in our mind: why do we need nuclear weapons? The only rational sensible answer is that we need them to deter another nuclear weapons state from using them against us—and nothing else. This is based on the reality that nuclear weapons cannot really deter other forms of violence, like terrorism, as even the United States realised on September 11, 2001. There are broadly two ways of achieving the goal of nuclear deterrence: either by a policy of using them first, or by a doctrine based on no-first-use. If the aim were to deter the use of conventional military power, then a first use strategy would be necessary. But, surely, India has sufficient capabilities (and capacity to enhance them) to successfully deal with any and every conceivable conventional military threat by conventional means at a level of investment of 3 per cent of GDP.

But to understand the logic of a no-first-use doctrine, it would be useful to look at the implications of using nuclear weapons first. To start with, the history of the past half century tells us that the credibility of nuclear deterrence relies heavily, if not completely, on the ability of a nation to undertake a ‘second strike’, that is, the ability to possess sufficient weapons which would survive the enemy’s first nuclear strike to be able to retaliate and cause unacceptable levels of damage and destruction.

This is expected to convince the adversary that its use of nuclear weapons would lead to its own assured destruction. It has also been clear for decades that there can be no certainty that the adversary’s nuclear arsenal can be completely destroyed in a first strike. This led to a series of historic developments.

First strike policy inevitably led to increasing the size of arsenals in a mutually debilitating arms race, which at one stage resulted in the existence of nearly 66,000 nuclear warheads mostly owned by two countries but deployed globally. This experience is at the root of concerns of a nuclear arms race in our region. But China did not enter that race because it did not opt for a first strike option and yet deterred both super powers. Surely, it would not serve our interest to start building an opened ended nuclear arsenal.

First strike policy also requires nuclear weapons to be kept on hair-trigger alert, so that they can be launched within minutes, if not seconds. The race is then to launch before the adversary launches its own weapons. Pre-emption becomes a key element in such a nuclear strategy.

Given huge arsenals, the extremely short time available, and the need to hit the other side first, this requires an elaborate command and control system, and its attendant complexities, costs and technologies, which currently exists only with Washington and Russia.

Such complexities also inevitably increase the risk of accidents, unauthorised use, less than adequate control (as in the case of submarines), or use due to miscalculation.

But the most important lesson is that if a second-strike was the acid test of nuclear deterrence, then why not rely on retaliation only? Assured retaliation amounts to a second-strike although no first strike would have been launched by us. But, like the second strike strategy, it requires the ability to launch sufficient nuclear weapons after the enemy’s nuclear strike. Even the simplest logic would tell us that survivability is the key to credible nuclear deterrence, and not the first strike policy per se.

And this must be capable of assured retaliation that would cause, what is euphemistically called, ‘unacceptable punishment’ to the aggressor. The no-first-use doctrine is the only way to ensure that they remain in a defensive role to be used only for counter-attack.

We also must objectively assess what would be the scenarios where India would need to use nuclear weapons first, warranting a first-use strategy and its attendant costs? A significant military setback, if not a decisive military defeat, or surprise breakthrough by the enemy with conventional forces, are two possible theoretical contingencies. But these could happen only if we allow our conventional military capability to go down to unacceptably dangerous levels. By any logic, therefore, a no-first-use doctrine is not only the best option for us, it also keeps the nuclear genie under better control.