The world situation after September 11, 2001, appears to have generated some new uncertainties in Beijing on how to deal with the evolving scenarios. China has shown near-spontaneous willingness to co-operate in the war against terrorism. Sceptics would say this is because of China’s own concerns in the western parts of the country and the risks of terrorism from Afghanistan-Pakistan-Central Asia spilling over into China, where the western regions have faced separatist violence in recent years. But deeper concerns appear to be arising out of the US policies in strategic terms.US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the way this was meekly accepted by Russia and America’s allies appears to have blown a hole in any thinking that the world would side with China on the issue. But this is also seen in the broader context of a setback to multilateralism and multilateral institutions responsible for arms control and strategic stability. The US posture of increasing unilateralism, the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive use of force relying on high technology military power that remains unmatched in the world, and the hype about the impending war against Iraq seem to have expedited a re-look at the nature of the evolving order. China in this respect appears to reflect the concerns of the international community at large although no one, and certainly not Beijing, is willing to come out openly against the US. The trend in China appears to be to deepen co-operation with the US working bilaterally and multilaterally, while co-operation with its allies in Europe and Asia is deepened separately.Some Chinese military strategic experts believe that the end of the Cold War has resulted in a shift of strategic concerns from the strong to the weak, and ‘failed’ states (which, according to them, includes Pakistan) have become major security concerns to the US. The military brass are also concerned about greater friction in the future between China and the US, especially as the latter moves toward operational missile defence systems which would ‘‘seriously endanger the credibility of Chinese strategic nuclear forces’’, enhancing China’s sense of vulnerability and leading to steps to enhance the survivability of these forces. The risk of an expanding cycle of mutual suspicions could vitiate bilateral relations as well as the security environment in Asia.China has always emphasised the importance of the UN and its primary responsibility for international peace and security. But given the nature of things at present, the emphasis on strengthening the UN, especially the Security Council, and re-establishing its authority has increased substantively. This is, of course, a natural corollary to the perceived need to strengthen multilateralism in preference to a unilateralist approach. In a way, this fits into the overall pattern of the evolving lexicon and substance of policy where multilateralism is offered to the world as a more attractive alternative to the unilateralism currently high on the US agenda. Hence the need to strengthen regional security institutions in Asia like the ARF and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.China’s approach to bilateral relations with India has undergone near dramatic changes after 1998, in spite of the hiccups in the weeks after the Indian nuclear tests. Since then the pace of change toward deeper and stronger relations has intensified. An increasing number of bilateral high level visits has helped to deepen mutual understanding although the resolution of some of the problems ‘left over by history’ seems very remote. China’s aim appears to be to keep progress on them in slow motion while building its own comprehensive power. This in no way should be seen to signal negative implications for India. In fact we would do well to adopt the same philosophy of building comprehensive national power while strengthening bilateral relations with China and maintaining peace and tranquillity on the borders. The increasing acknowledgment of a greater role for India is implicit in the twin strands of multilateralism and the question of strengthening the UN The increasing acknowledgment of a greater role for India in world affairs is implicit in the twin strands of multilateralism and the question of strengthening the UN. Many in China now emphasise the importance of India qua India, while concluding that it was not a good thing for the UN Security Council to have only one solitary developing Asian country as a permanent member. An increasing number of responsible people in Beijing seem to be arguing for the need to bring India into the UN Security Council as a permanent member so as to recognise geopolitical realities and strengthen the UN. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the government is ready to support this view. Meanwhile, a wider support for the idea of a China-Japan-India co-operative triangle based on strengthening bilateral as well as trilateral co-operation seems to be growing.Bilateral trade is increasing, though in absolute terms it is marginal even for India, leave alone China. But the process is opening up new avenues and a new understanding of the potential for future trade. For example, the Chinese recognise the software strength of Indians while they have progressed far in the hardware arenas. This is an example of the complementarities that need to be explored. Direct flights between Beijing/Shanghai and Delhi have practically brought the two countries closer. What is needed is to recognise this and build on it.A new dynamic seems to be operating in China and we would need to look for opportunities for strengthening the growing bilateral relationship. This would also include enhancing border trade and responding positively to Chinese initiatives to opening up new opportunities like over-land trade with Tibet and/or implementing the Kunming Initiative. There may be residual concerns about the strategic and security implications of such steps. But we must objectively assess the cost-benefit ratio of engaging China as well as not engaging China across the land frontiers through trade and investments. The answer clearly lies in deepening and broadening engagement.
