Checking out the new guys

“The Americans want to see how much steel there is in Vajpayee,” defence analysts here feel, pointing out that a number of statements in the last month by senior leaders in the BJP actually point in a direction not indicated in the manifesto.

The most revealing of all these are comments by Defence MinisterGeorge Fernandes, who not only has veritably discarded the BJP’s nuclear ambition, but also junked the need for any more tests for the Agni, India’s own intermediate-range ballistic missile. Nevertheless, by the weekend, Fernandes seemed to have backtracked considerably, telling a national daily that while the Agni may not need any more tests, he never said it would never begin serial production.

The American team, led by Richardson and assisted by Karl Frederick Inderfurth, the pointperson in the US State department for South Asia and Bruce Riedel, senior director in the US National Security Council, will be meeting Fernandes and other ministers in an attempt “to get to know them better.” Whatever Fernandes’ own views on India’s felt need to go nuclear, human rights violations in Myanmar and Tibet — interestingly, the Americans may find themselves endearingly close to him on the two latter counts — Washington is clearly uncomfortable with this old firebrand Socialist who openly wears his `what the UScan do, India can do better’ heart on his sleeve.

The US trip, of course, is to clearly drive home the message that it intends to retain its place as the Old Faithful (at least for some nations) in South Asia’s chequerboard of historical rivalry. So, Inderfurth, briefing reporters in Washington on the trip last week, said Richardson would be “making a very, very strong effort to encourage and support a resumption of the Indo-Pak dialogue” both with Vajpayee and Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif.

With the shadow of Pakistan’s `Ghauri’ missile looming large over the impending trip, Inderfurth added, “We will also, of course, raise our concerns…about further nuclear and missile developments…So we are hopeful that the two governments will show restraint.”

A former journalist, Inderfurth couldn’t be more blunt about the role his government saw for itself in South Asia: “We want to see these talks, which have been suspended now for some time… resumed, now that governments are in place…We havesaid that we have no intention of being a mediator of the Kashmir dispute. But we are going to encourage them to move forward on all the areas of contention…”

The foreign office here, used to this double-edged rhetoric for years, is not saying a word, but some analysts did not hide their concern: “The US wants to ensure that its role as a third-party in the Indo-Pak dialogue doesn’t disappear, even though we’ve told them again and again that the Islamabad-New Delhi dispute is a bilateral one.”

These analysts pointed out that the US, not comfortable with India’s nuclear threshold status, wanted to defang New Delhi, so that its “radius for power projection” could be limited to South Asia. Any forays into Afghanistan for example, or the Persian Gulf or Central Asia, would then be met by a curt slap on the wrists.

Unless of course, other strategic experts said, New Delhi decided that it was ready to play ball with Washington. Picking up from the everready “oldest democracy-largest democracy” cue,the BJP government could well enact over the next couple of years an elaborately staged nuclear charade, which may at some point culminate in the grandest bargain of all time: giving up a decaying, 24-year-old nuclear option in return for the status and recognition of a newly arrived state, full of promise and energy. To call this a “deal” would be crass, but if it could be imbued with the effort of fulfillment — especially if the BJP Task Force took its own time to undertake a Strategic Defence Review — the months spent in “strategising” might be worth it.

Inderfurth at the Washington briefing resolutely denied the US would be “taking any quid pro quo”, not even in nuclear exchange for a permanent Security Council seat for India. He nevertheless conceded that the “Indian government has very strong views on this issue” but would not admit that the US had begun to look beyond Germany and Japan.

Interestingly, it doesn’t seem as if the government is today keen on exercising such a bargain. The BJPrealises that Washington would be willing to overlook its “fundamentalist” image if it keeps the economy open for foreign investors. The government hopes that once these investors are hooked onto the huge profit margins of the Indian market, it will earn for itself the freedom to experiment with most things — including the bomb.

The problem, however, is the time it takes for the nation to traverse that distance, and whether by the end of the journey India would still also care about the moral high ground. That’s why the Richardson trip is a landmark: it marks the beginning of a self-discovery whose story could have many endings.