There's a saying that if a lady says “no” she means “may be”, when she says “may be” she means “yes” and if she says “yes”, she is not a lady. If a diplomat says “yes” he means “may be”, when he says “may be” he means “no” and if he says “no”, he’s not a diplomat. Going by the recent spate of articles on a likely Indo-Pak dialogue, the common refrain is “may be”. Most of those who have spoken are old diplomats. Not many soldiers have been asked their opinion. Few realise, too, that at the Agra talks, the three army chiefs were seen only at the ceremonial reception, departure and banquet. There was no report of their having been heard at the meetings. Consequently, the stage was set for a diplomatic cul-de-sac.A lot of water has since flowed down the Indus since. This time around General Musharraf knows that between Allah, Army and the Americans, only the Americans can ensure his continuance in power. Therefore, when the US asked him to talk to India, he knew they meant serious talks, not “may be” talks. It is no secret that the US has been talking a lot, both to India and Pakistan. General Musharraf was firmly told to stop cross-border terrorism. Why then has it not stopped? Perhaps terrorism across the border, specially the LoC, is like a leaky valve, which cannot be fixed beyond a point unless you change the complete system. The US is in no hurry to do this yet, based on a simple geopolitical cost benefit analysis.Therefore, the insistence on a complete stop to the cross border terrorism, shows geographic, historical, political and military innocence. Of course, a lasting solution to Indo-Pakistan problems can only be brought about by the ending of terrorist activities in India in general and Kashmir in particular. The US is certainly not innocent about these matters. But perhaps the US is innocent about the place of a key element in any Indo-Pak dialogue: the Indian Armed Forces.Of late, successive service chiefs have appeared helpless against the steady distancing of the army from policy making, possibly due to the advisory space at the top being occupied by bureaucrats of every hue including khaki. Also, the system has strayed from well-established principals which ensured that power flowed through well laid down channels. Americans are often surprised why the cabinet secretary or the chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, cannot come up with a firm “yes” or “no” and have to resort to a “maybe” on issues that are within their area of responsibility. As a result, the engagement with the Indian Armed Forces by the Pentagon has not been quite in sync with that between the MEA and the State Department. Yet this has to be achieved if the Indo-Pak dialogue is to succeed. The problem is institutional. One change for the better has been the development of a direct line between the PMO and the various chambers of commerce. May be the Armed Forces need to take a cue from this.We must also realise that the present Pakistani dispensation cannot change the way the state functions beyond a point without disrupting the delicate equation established by General Musharraf between various factions and the US. To expect Prime Minister Jamali to take far-reaching decisions may be over-ambitious. So how do we move in terms of Indo-Pak dialogue? First, we need to deal with Pakistan on an ‘as is, where is’ basis, duly bringing the military into the negotiations. This will ensure that even if the talks fail at the diplomatic level, some crucial military Confidence Building Measures may get renewed, specially in the nuclear and LoC domains, enabling better calibration of military tension and allowing room for future talks. Second, we need to recognise that the army has to be brought into the decision making loop, to bring it into sync with the Pentagon and the State Department-led initiatives.What about Pakistan? Can Musharraf manage the risk of a compromise solution on Kashmir? Based on my personal knowledge of him, I had said in 2001 that he would deliver results. There were not many takers for this then. Many felt that he would not survive. Well, he has not only survived but proved that he is everyone’s best bet in Pakistan. Musharraf can again play the “national interest” card for a lasting solution on Kashmir, while he is still backed by the army. He has three qualities required of a good soldier: To be a poacher, gunman and gambler. He has proved these qualities in war, he now needs to prove them in peace. Vajpayee has already said it would be his last attempt at peace. Will General Musharraf take the challenge? Being the president gives him a fall back position. It is a tailor made win-win situation for him. General Musharraf cannot afford to say “may be”. Let’s hope it is a “yes” to finding a permanent solution to our common problems.(The writer was chief of staff, Western Command. He had attended a course at the Royal College of Defence Studies with Musharraf)
