Breaking the ice

The paradox of Siachen is symbolic of the nature of Pakistan-India relations: it is perhaps the simplest bilateral dispute to resolve based on facts and existing commitments, and yet it seems to drag on for extraneous reasons. After all, in ’89, the two countries had practically concluded a mutually acceptable agreement; and this had again been accepted by them in ’93, with minor changes after negotiations between the two defence secretaries. Two decades of the conflict that has often erupted into a shooting war does not seem to have led to any responsible acceptance of the reality of the dispute. The bilateral Karachi Agreement of July ’49 clearly defines the parameters of the ceasefire line resulting from the war. This line was demarcated up to the now well-known point, NJ-9842, at the southern end of the Saltoro Ridge.

The Karachi Agreement stipulated that the line would run “northward” from point NJ-9842 and was to be demarcated later. Such demarcation never took place and, after 1972, Pakistan started to claim that the ceasefire line would run eastward to the Karakoram Pass. International norms in defining borders in mountainous regions is to mark it along the watershed, which in this case is along the Saltoro Ridge with the Siachen glaciers to the east of it and the Baltoro glaciers to the west. This is also the line along which the two armies are actually holding position for the past two decades; and that is why the terminology accepted during the previous negotiations was ‘AGPL’ or ‘Actual Ground Position Line’. New Delhi must publish the terrain maps of the area with the line held by troops for two decades from NJ-9842 northward.

The AGPL is the key to the settlement of the problem since it conforms to the Karachi Agreement and international norms. But the army in Pakistan continues to suffer from frustrations about its failure to occupy Siachen, and that is why even Pervez Musharraf has tended to equate his aggression in the Kargil sector across the accepted LoC in ’98-’99 with Siachen! The Indian army has a concern, a legitimate one, that if it redeploys after an agreement on the AGPL, and Pakistan resiles from its commitment and occupies the Saltoro Ridge and Siachen region, it would be extremely difficult and costly to militarily make it vacate these positions. If the current dialogue process does not produce results, one solution would be to publish the terrain maps of the area, and plan a phased withdrawal of our ground troops. If, after this, there are any illegal movements across the AGPL, the only viable option for India would be to use air power to control it.