Blunting of the instrument

At the outset, let me state unambiguously that I am as much against corruption and financial irregularities, particularly in defence procurements, as any good co-citizen of my country. Some years ago, the defence budget used to be passed by both houses of the Parliament without any debate. There was seldom any constructive debate on defence planning or defence expenditure in the Parliament, or outside. Without much knowledge about defence, Parliament and the media treated the services and their affairs as a ‘holy cow’. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which is responsible for defence policies, preparedness, and controls the defence services, seldom faced any awkward questions.

We fought wars in 1947-48, 1962 and 1965, ‘reactively’, at short notice, without adequate preparedness. The outcome is well known. Fortunately, the situation for 1971 war was different. It was partly a ‘pro active’ action, and the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs agreed on the likely D-day well in advance which gave ample time to the MoD and the forces to prepare for the war. Despite these wars, our defence planning has continued to suffer due to inadequate understanding by officials and public, adhoc budgetary allocations, lack of transparency, cumbersome procedures and scams.

Ever since the Bofors controversy, there are more debates in the Parliament, mostly about defence purchases, and mostly acrimonious. The Opposition (whichever) blames the Government for the lack of defence preparedness but it also raises controversy over every purchase. The media, the CAG, the PAC, and the CVC; all keep talking of scams, procedural lapses, and delays. And yet these scams and delays seem to continue.

Defence forces are based on the required combat capability to deal with envisaged threats. ‘Capabilities’ are not purchasable off the shelf. It is a time-consuming process to translate ’money’ into ’capability’. The weapons and equipment have to be made or purchased, then absorbed; tactics and procedures revised, personnel trained, and maintenance capabilities built up… it takes time. The cost and time to build combat capabilities gets multiplied — grows exponentially — with every year of neglect.

All these bring us to the vexed issue of defence planning. Defence planning is the process of determining national security goals and objectives and formulation of policies and strategies that will govern (a) allocation of funds (b) building of capabilities (acquisitions and organisations) and (c) use or deployment of these capabilities to achieve given objectives. A credible defence planning has to have a long-term focus. Unfortunately, for the reasons that I have given earlier, there is always a huge gap between our planning and implementation.

A word about the post-Kargil CAG Review of defence purchases. At the outset, I must state that the CAG is an important democratic institution. I have full respect for its role and the difficult tasks that it has to perform. In the CAG Review it was stated that the ‘‘Ministry of Defence relaxed extant procedures to quickly secure supplies for Operation Vijay launched in May/June 1999… Nearly all the supplies were either received or contracted and received well after cessation of hostilities and therefore in no way supported the operation. Supplies valued at Rs 2,150 crore were received after the cessation of hostilities in July 1999… Supplies valued at Rs 1,606.26 crore were contracted after the cessation of hostilities in July 1999… In 35 cases detailed in the report, relaxation of rules and procedure led to the Government ’knowingly’ (?) paying Rs 44.21 crore more… Ammunition worth Rs 342.37 crore was contracted for import on grounds of operational emergency even though it was being produced in ordnance factories or PSUs. While critical supplies of clothing, ammunition and arms could not reach the troops during the operation, an amount of Rs 1,046 crore almost half of the total, entirely in forex, was spent fruitlessly, breaching established principles of propriety’’.

Everyone knows that due to many years of neglect, we had serious shortages of weapons, equipment, even clothing required for high altitude warfare at the time of the Kargil war. Such deficiencies and short capabilities existed in all three services. When pointed out by the Service Chiefs, the Government agreed to procure some items urgently. Prioritised lists were prepared, discussed and finalised in the MoD for procurement within a given timeframe. The aim was to bring the forces to a certain level of readiness so that we would be able to deal with the threat. Did these purchases become unnecessary or fruitless during the Kargil war or as soon it was over? Did the intelligence agencies, the Government and rest of the nation give an assurance to the armed forces that there would be no threat on our borders after July 26, 1999 for sometime and, therefore, we could take our own time? And pray, why would anyone seek import of equipment and ammunition from abroad if this was available within defence establishments of the country? What about our procurement system that is so vital for defence preparedness? In February 1998, I gave a presentation of Army’s preparedness and total budgetary requirements to the Finance Secretary, Defence Secretary, Expenditure Secretary, and other colleagues. After making my case, I ended up by stating ‘‘We are in a Catch 22 situation… We don’t have the money… If we have the money, we can’t spend it… Which is as good as… We don’t have the money.’’

Thanks to our scams, suspected scams and prolonged acrimonious debates in the Parliament and the media, no civil or military official is willing to give any decision and expedite purchase of overdue weapons and equipment. How do we explain this to the troops on the front? Who is accountable to them? Since we have suffered so long I would like to ask; is the defence preparedness and capability more important or our antiquated procurement procedures? If we are so scared of scams, why don’t we, at some stage of the procedures, include some Members of Parliament, the CAG or CVC in the procurement system for major purchases?

I believe that the system and procedures must meet the national requirement including the urgency for which they have been laid out. Of course, that does not mean that honesty and integrity should be compromised. These days when every one talks so glibly about the deteriorating security environment it is high time that those involved in the purchase and audit of defence equipment — politicians, audit and vigilance committees, civil and military officials — have a detailed look at our defence planning, procurements procedures, and state of preparedness. This should be a serious security concern today.