In the history of every nation, there are events that with the benefit of hindsight can be said to have altered the trajectory of its development. The partition of the subcontinent is an example; the adoption by Nehru of the state-directed model of economic development in the 1950s is another; the dismantlement of the “License Raj” and the onset of liberal economics in the 1990s is one more.
It is my view that the 123 agreement, if eventually legislated, will in time be seen to have had comparable impact. This is not because it will have secured us the fuel for nuclear energy; nor because it will have brought us formal recognition as a nuclear power; nor because it will have cemented our relations with the US. It will be because it reordered our national priorities to place economic growth, social stability and environmental protection firmly above military prowess in the policy agenda. It will be because it will have removed the roadblocks that prevent us today from accessing “cutting edge” technologies and becoming a competitive 21st century economic super power. It will be because it will have strengthened our national security more than had our decision makers continued to see security through the conventional prism of bombs and bullets.
The critics of the 123 agreement argue that the deal will abridge our sovereignty. I am not sure I fully understand the intricacies of the juridical and technical debate, but I do know that in today’s global and connected world, the conventional notions of sovereignty have been stood on their head; and that those critics who believe that a closer affiliation with the US will compromise our sovereignty must introspect honestly as to whether their view reflects the reality of 21st century geopolitics or simply ideological atavism. If the latter, then clearly no amount of reasoning will shift their position. But if the former, then perhaps they should contemplate the experiences of the Soviet Union, Russia and America.
The Soviet Union was a nuclear super power but “lost” its sovereignty — not because of external aggression, but inter alia the economic and social costs of seeking nuclear parity with the US. Russia inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal but whilst its economy stumbled it was hardly in a “secure” state. It acquired its current standing — it is a member of the G8 and it’s market is the cynosure of major international companies — only after it had on the back of its enormous oil and gas reserves, set its economic house in order. The US is undoubtedly the strongest military power in the world. But time and again weaker nations have cocked their sovereign nose at the US. It was humiliated in Vietnam; it is struggling to subdue the Taliban and its campaign in Iraq is a disaster. The international influence of the US does not flow from the portals of Pentagon. It flows from the depth of its civic institutions, the size and potential of its market, the excellence of its educational system and the superiority of its technology.
The messages are clear. The greatest threat to a country’s sovereignty comes not from without — the expansionist aspirations of an adversary — but from within — the fallout of economic mismanagement, social dislocation and political bankruptcy. Concepts like natural security through the compartmentalised prism of military preparedness, political agendas and economics are an artificial divide. The real world does not allow for such segmented analysis. In it everything is intertwined. A country’s military strength is only one (and perhaps an increasingly small) component of this interwoven fabric.
The 123 agreement is pathbreaking because it acknowledges implicitly (if not explicitly) this interrelationship. It accepts that India’s security depends more on the strength of its economy, society and the environment and the nature of the balance between them than on whether it has the ‘notional’ capability to deter a nuclear adversary. I say notional because there will be no victor in a nuclear exchange. It is pathbreaking because it contemporises the notion of sovereignty and national security.
Critics have pointed out that nuclear energy will only contribute 7 per cent of our energy requirements by 2020-25. So why, they ask, is the government risking so much for apparently so little? But the fact is the deal will throw open a broad spectrum of technological options that in time will make it easier for us to achieve energy security.
We must not forget three realities. One, the Indian economy is hugely dependent (about 70 per cent) on hydrocarbons — oil, gas and coal. And that this dependence will continue for the foreseeable future. Two, the linkage between economic growth, energy demand and environmental degradation has to weaken if we are to stabilise carbon emissions and safeguard against the worst consequence of global warming. And three, technology is the key to progress.
The 123 agreement should be supported not simply because it rewrites the paradigms on sovereignty and security but because it provides the springboard from which India can forge the crucial technological partnerships on which growth can be sustainably built. These partnerships could cover a broad spectrum of activities including medicine, agriculture, industry and services. And in energy in particular they could facilitate the “greening” of fossil fuels (coal to liquids, coal, gasification) and the development of practical, commercially viable and affordable alternatives to hydrocarbons, (hydrogen fuel cells, cellulosic bio fuels, thin film solar and nuclear).
The writer is chairman of the Shell Group of Companies in India. Views are personal