At IAEA, Karat, Advani have an unusual ally: Islamabad…

In a letter to the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG), of which Pakistan is also a member, Islamabad’s permanent representative at Vienna has said that the Board was being asked to “recognise and accept India’s nuclear weapon status”. “The draft accords recognition to India as a country with ‘advanced nuclear technology’, despite the fact that there is no agreed definition of an advanced nuclear technology state,” it says.

The letter was circulated to the Board members just a few days ago as Pakistan stepped up efforts to block the approval of the safeguards agreement draft by the Board of Governors, which decides by consensus. Hectic diplomacy is on with the US trying to persuade Pakistan to see reason and not stand in the way.

Citing rules and the unique nature of this agreement, Pakistan has questioned the efforts to “rush through” the process of approval by the Board and NSG. In the letter, it says there was “no good technical or substantive reasons” for the Board to waive off the 45-day period before it can be considered for approval.

“The political exigencies of either India or the US are not sufficient reason…to waive the 45 days rule which is designed to enable members to carefully examine the content and implications of any Agreement so as to ensure that it serves the purpose of credible verification of non-diversion for which it is being concluded,” the letter says.

Describing the draft and “unjustified call for an exemption to India alone from the NSG rules” as “discriminatory and dangerous”, Pakistan says that it was “important to resist the drive to steamroll this agreement through the IAEA-BoG and the NSG”.

Here are some points made by Pakistan in its letter, which can be food for thought for the Opposition in respect of how this agreement is being viewed across the border. These are, as per the text of the letter:

• The draft accords recognition to India as a country with “advanced nuclear technology”, despite the fact that there is no agreed definition of an “advanced nuclear technology” state.

• A most disturbing feature of the Agreement is the reference and reflection in the Preamble to the India-US Joint Statement of 18 July 2005. The Agreement specifically notes India’s “willingness” to “identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities”. Thus, the IAEA-BOG is being asked to recognize and accept India’s nuclear weapon status.

• This Agreement is described as an “umbrella agreement”. Facilities to be safeguarded have not been listed. They will be added to the Safeguards Agreement as they are notified by India. What is the purpose of the Agreement if the facilities to be safeguarded are not known?

• Despite India’s refusal to place its Breeder Reactors and its Thorium-based programme under safeguards, the draft recognizes India’s three-stage nuclear programme. This is gratuitous legitimization of potential nuclear proliferation and contrary to the IAEA’s objectives.

• Such concerns are compounded further by other provisions of the Agreement, especially (a) the ambiguous provisions regarding conditions for the termination of the Safeguards Agreements; (b) access for India to the international fuel markets; and (c) unspecified ‘corrective measures’ which India would be allowed to take to “ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors,” contravening the continuation of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity.

• The Agreement may indeed provide an incentive to India to conduct further nuclear weapons testing, since future termination of the Safeguards Agreement, after India has built up an adequate fuel reserve, would resolve India’s problems relating to the shortage of nuclear material for both its civilian and its nuclear weapons programme.

• The IAEA statute does not provide for differentiation between member states on the basis of political consideration nor does it allow for special treatment for a particular state. Calling it an India-specific agreement is therefore unprecedented. Since the IAEA concludes safeguards agreements based on approved models, it will be important that any safeguards agreement adopted by the BoG in respect of India should be available as a model for other non-NPT states.

• Unjustified call for an exemption to India alone from the NSG rules is discriminatory and dangerous.