
The only point of confusion about Monday8217;s debut of the LTTE8217;s 8216;air force8217; is the number of aircraft used. The Tigers claim they sent two light aircraft hundreds of kilometres out from territory controlled by them to attack the Sri Lankan air force8217;s primary base on Colombo8217;s outskirts; the Lankan military say just one plane was used. But the outrageously audacious choice of target makes one thing clear: non-state actors cannot be permitted to maintain air strike capability. The air base is adjacent to Sri Lanka8217;s only international airport, and shares a runway with it. The prospect of the Tigers striking from the air magnifies many times over their capacity to inflict damage to life and property. Very detailed protocol guides the use of aircraft globally. A violently insurgent group like the LTTE has this week put in jeopardy even that. The LTTE must be immediately made aware that by this act, it stands to lose what is left of the tolerance overground it had gained by that now-tattered 2002 ceasefire.
And, for all the depressing news coming out of Sri Lanka this past year of escalated civil war 8212; with 4,000 lives estimated to have been lost in 15 months 8212; one still cannot discard the possibility of Colombo returning to negotiations with the LTTE. There is a sense, as the fight for territory intensifies in the north and the east, that the military and the Tigers are trying to reach a perceived position of strength to consolidate their respective bargaining positions.