Airmiss probe points finger at faulty radar

However, more alarming is the revelation that these secondary radars have been on ‘‘trial’’ basis for the past 18 months. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation, which is responsible for approving these radars, is yet to commission them officially. Thus, if any of these radars were to malfunction, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) is not obliged to issue a notice to airmen warning them in advance of the problem, a scenario which preceded the Monday incident.

There was no prior warning and both aircraft cruising at an altitude of 27,000 feet came dangerously close to each other without anyone on ground noticing that the mandatory 10-mile separation between the two aircraft had been violated. It was the Indian Airlines (IC-439) pilot who received a warning alarm in the cockpit and reported the same on landing.

Sources said such situations do not occur frequently because only few routes passed over these skies. However, following the implementation of the new route structure in November last year, there has been a sudden increase in the number of aircraft flying on the same altitude.

Reacting sharply after the incident, General Secretary of the Air Traffic Controllers’ Guild Brijendra Shekhar said ground-based facilities ought to have been put in prime shape before implementing the route structure. ‘‘Owing to the poor homework on the part of various authorities, the number of airmiss incidents have gone up in the past few months’’, he said.