New Delhi is a soulless city. And it is, therefore, prone to throwing up an incredible galaxy of coalitions in its discourses. From lumpen capitalists to the well-heeled multiplex types, all find a place to come together under the capital’s sun. But no issue has cast together as motley a collection of interests as the current series of nuclear tests. From theoretical free-marketeers to conceptual communists, from protectors of secularism to internationalist visionaries, there is unison in denouncing the Shakti ’98 nuclear test series. The arguments of all these groups border on the neo-Luddite.
India already had a nuclear deterrent since 1974, there was no need to demonstrate the same in 1998; the country will sink financially as it has been isolated from the world, and there has been a great setback to diplomacy vis-a-vis the neighbours and the region. This is the gist of all that New Delhi’s latest, and thus far the most bizarre, confederation of interests has to say.
For starters, if India did indeedhave a credible deterrent since 1974, it would not have been waging a full-scale war over the Siachen glacier and tackling numerous proxy ones elsewhere. A deterrent would not have allowed the neighbourhood to violate India’s security as it has done repeatedly and with impunity. And to top it, a credible deterrent would also have allowed for a breakthrough on the border talks with the conservative People’s Republic of China.
So despite what was demonstrated at Pokharan on May 18 1974, no one took India’s status and ability with even a hint of seriousness. For all understood one basic technical fact — the 1974 test was of a "warhead-capable" design and not a usable weapon system. So India was neither a nuclear have nor a nuclear have-not. The country gained nothing diplomatically or even militarily from the 1974 test. The process, therefore, from that test to actualising warheads required greater technical expertise, engineering skills in metallurgy, aerodynamics and environmental finesse. The road fromBuddha Purnima 1974 to Buddha Purnima 1998 is as far travelled as one from say a Baby Hindustan to an Astra.
Pokharan 1998 is a great leap forward in the technologies demonstrated, so for the union of the aggrieved to claim that the tests were scientifically irrelevant is to display a serious degree of ignorance. ‘Tis a pity, for what could have been a riveting debate on the technology to be achieved and absorbed has been reduced to one between the jurassic and the jingoistic.
On the question of India becoming a sinking ship owing to feared isolation vis-a-vis the world community, nothing could be more full of untruth. If the Indian economy is to sink it will do so on account of the moronic nature of its management. The economy is in a mess not because of the tests but for the simple reason that the latent Indian enterprise has been thwarted and mediocrity sheltered. So for the free-marketeers to blame the tests for grounding the economy is to display intellectual slothfulness. Most are not even aware ofthe technology-denial regimes that exist and have already been slapped on India despite the fact that it has not weaponised its nuclear systems, not imported or exported missile or rocket technologies, nor been involved in the smuggling of dual-use technologies.
Restraint brought denial, so the best way to move forward is to engage is as an equal and responsible partner. And morally India can only do that by its judicious and equitable participation in the test-ban and fissile-material control treaties. India’s compliance will open hitherto closed doors on civilian-use technologies which the country needs for economic regeneration. They won’t come for a song, and neither will they come from servitude. They come from demonstrated national action, which is then taken to its logical end.
Confidence-building measures, that peculiarity of the amateur self-appointed diplomat, have now been rendered useless, they said. But the plain fact is that lighting candles at Wagah or Walong is no substitute for concertedpolitical and diplomatic action. Anybody who thought Indian concerns were taken seriously internationally, or even regionally, suffers from self delusion. While recognising India as its main adversary of the future, the People’s Republic of China attached a rider — India would have to do something drastic to change its power equations in order to become the threat that it is capable of becoming. Hardly surprising then that Quenmoy Bay and South China Sea found greater focus from Beijing than India.
The reaction of the conservative communo-capitalists ruling in Beijing is, therefore, the most satisfying. If the People’s Republic is forced to call for international action against India it means they have understood the magnitude of the technologies involved in Shakti ’98. For the first time Beijing is feeling the pinch, particularly when it involves China’s soft underbelly, Tibet. How India’s diplomatic standing has declined from its "natural interests in Lhasa" to the routine "the time is not right now"from Chinese interlocutors at the border talks, is a matter of shame for the country. India signed the border agreement without first agreeing to a border, so the Chinese were bound to disregard New Delhi’s positions. The working and expert groups have yet to come up with something tangible. Now India’s diplomacy will have the spine missing thus far, and so the Beijing reaction could well be a pointer toward some achievement at long last.
The other great reaction has been from down under. The Australians are a laugh, given to a wicked sense of humour but this time outdoing themselves. The only country in the world that has allowed another nation to test nuclear weapons on its soil telling India what is good and bad! Recalling diplomats would have been an extremely good practical joke had it also not been so hypocritical. "In one specific respect the alliance (ANZUS — Australia, New Zealand, United States) does provide a clearer expectation of US support — that is, defence against nuclear attack. While therisk of nuclear attack on Australia remains very low, the possibility cannot entirely be ruled out. In those circumstances we would rely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States to deter such an attack." Reprinted without permission from "Australia’s Strategic Policy", Department of Defence, 1997. A break is sorely needed.