After Hidma took over, Battalion 1 ambushed a security team at Chintalnar village in Dantewada, killing 76 jawans. It remains one of the deadliest Maoist attacks to date, making Hidma one of the most wanted men on the security forces' list.
The battle between the forces and Battalion 1 continued until 2024Maoist leader Madvi Hidma Encounter: The first time Kamlochan Kashyap, Deputy Inspector General of South Bastar, heard of Madvi Hidma was in 2007, soon after Maoists attacked and killed 23 jawans, many of them CRPF personnel, at Urpalmetta in Dantewada.
The attack saw Hidma swiftly rising through the Maoist ranks, turning him into a headache for the forces and setting them off on a decades-long chase through the forests of Bastar that ended on November 18, with his killing in an encounter with the Andhra Pradesh Police.
“In 2007, Hidma was commander of Company Number 3 in Bastar. Two years later, he was promoted as deputy commander of Battalion 1, and the same year, he went on to head it,” says Kashyap, who has been serving in Bastar for over a decade.
Under Hidma, Battalion 1 grew to be a dreaded unit, carrying out some of the bloodiest attacks on the forces. In 2010, a year after he took over, Battalion 1 ambushed a security team at Chintalnar village in Dantewada, killing 76 jawans. It remains one of the deadliest Maoist attacks to date, making Hidma one of the most wanted men on the security forces’ list. The battle between the forces and Battalion 1 under Hidma continued till 2024, a period that saw over 155 jawans getting killed.
“Seeing his audacity for launching violent attacks on forces, the Maoist leadership nurtured and promoted him,” says D M Awasthi, who was Director General of Police from 2018 to 2021.
Officers say their hunt for Hidma had several frustrating moments — while the forces always knew where exactly Hidma was in south Bastar, the terrain and the security vacuum meant they couldn’t reach him.
“He had become our nemesis. He led a strong force of 250 men in Battalion 1. Our biggest issue until last year was that our security camps were not that deep (inside Bastar). Launching operations were a risk. During monsoons, it was not possible because the terrain would be marshy and during summer, dehydration was a major issue,” says a police officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Top Naxalite commander Madvi Hidma, who had masterminded several attacks over the last two decades, was killed in an encounter in neighbouring Andhra Pradesh on Tuesday. (CRPF via PTI Photo)
“We once got information that he was merely 20 kilometres away, yet, we could not get him. The militia would burst crackers and alert Hidma’s battalion even before we could reach anywhere near him,” he says.
What helped Battalion 1 was the security vacuum in Bastar — across thousands of square kilometers of forest area in Bijapur and Sukma, in an area contiguous with Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Maharashtra, there was almost no police presence.
“Between 2016 and 2021, Hidma was involved in at least 12 exchanges of fire with our forces. We conducted over 50 operations to nab him but he managed to escape each time. He was a good strategist and had equipped his battalion with modern weapons. He was also a hero among the villagers, even if that support may have been out of fear,” says Awasthi.
According to official data, Hidma was involved in the killings of 260 jawans and 81 civilians.
He recalls how small groups from Battalion 1 would quietly trail the jawans as they ventured deep inside the forest for operations that sometimes lasted around three days. The Maoists would lie in wait and ambush the jawans when they returned exhausted and dehydrated. “It was classic guerilla warfare tactic. It was then that I realised that we had to plan shorter operations, whether we get success or not. From 2017 (after 37 CRPF jawans were killed by Battalion 1 in back-to-back attacks over two months), we changed the operation timings, Jawans would leave in the evening and return before the next evening,” says Awasthi.
What changed the equation were the security camps. In 2017, the government realised that the only way to take on the Maoists was to set up security bases deep inside the jungle — until then, the camps were mostly located on the highways. “In 2017, our forces went to Hidma’s village Puvarti, but it took us 14 hours to reach there,” says Awasthi.
The presence of the camps, says an officer, forced Hidma to break his formation into smaller groups.
“Over the last two years, more than 25 camps were opened at Bijapur and Sukma in the battalion’s core area. We launched several aggressive operations,” says Sukma Superintendent of Police, Kiran Chawan.
“The camps helped us cut off the support villages provided to Hidma’s Battalion 1. Wherever the Battalion moved, we launched operations,” says Bijapur SP Jitendra Kumar Yadav.
But the battle was far from over. In 2021, Hidma’s Battalion 1 laid a trap and killed 22 jawans at Tekalgudem, around 5 kilometres from his Puvarti village. The jawans had no choice but to retreat, leaving behind bodies of their colleagues.
The breakthrough came in January 2024, when the forces clashed with Hidma’s Battalion 1 in Tekalgudem. While the forces managed to push back the Maoists, they lost three of their jawans. But it would mark the beginning of the end for Hidma.
Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Sundarraj P says, “Over the last two to three years, we launched over a dozen operations where we came close to catching him but his Battalion 1 formed several cordons and saved him. Our operations forced him to leave the Battalion and became like a fish out of water.”


