Written by Mahi Pal The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) retaining power in the recent Gujarat Assembly elections, albeit with a considerably reduced majority, has been analysed by political and economic commentators mainly from the standpoint of caste, agricultural distress and rural-urban divide factors. This article seeks to highlight an additional factor that may have contributed to the ruling party’s reverses, especially in the state’s rural hinterland: the lack of empowerment of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). The alienation resulting from the steady undermining of these bodies of village local self-government could well have aggravated the impact of Patidar unrest or low cotton and groundnut prices. According to the Union Ministry of Panchayati Raj’s latest Devolution Report for 2015-16, Gujarat has achieved only 48 per cent aggregate devolution of powers and resources to PRIs on a scale of 100. This figure — measured in terms of the transfer of functions (the 29 subjects/areas covered under the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution), functionaries (personnel available to discharge the tasks assigned) and finances (quantum of funds that can be autonomously spent) — was below that of Kerala (76 per cent), Karnataka (65 per cent), Maharashtra (60 per cent), Tamil Nadu (53 per cent), Telangana (51 per cent), Sikkim (50 per cent), and West Bengal (49 per cent). The non-strengthening of PRIs — more than 25 years after the 73rd Amendment that granted them Constitutional status — is significant for a state where a single party has been in power for such a long period. The disempowerment of these institutions over time may have created dissatisfaction amongst the heads of the Gram (village), Taluka (sub-district) and Zilla (district) panchayats, whose affairs today are largely managed by an entrenched state government bureaucracy. Given the limited stakes of elected local representatives in the overall rural governance structure, it would have translated into waning support for the ruling party and eventually reflected in its seats tally. It is significant to note that Gujarat’s Panchayati Raj Act has a compulsory provision for formation of Social Justice Committees at the village, block and district levels. But one study, conducted in 2010 by Rajesh Bhat and Santosh Kumar, has revealed that these committees — which are meant to promote the participation of Dalits, Adivasis and other marginalised communities in local self-governance institutions — had not even been constituted in most village panchayats. Even where the committees existed, the issues taken up by them pertained to drinking water, drainage system and upkeep of roads in Dalit/Adivasi neighbourhoods, while not addressing deep-rooted problems of untouchability, social exclusion and alcoholism specific to these communities. Adivasis not only constitute over 23 per cent of Gujarat's rural population. The high share of Adivasis — the state accounts for 8.5 per cent of the country’s overall tribal population — has also meant that Gujarat is covered under the Provisions of the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act of 1996. This law, better known as PESA, vests the Gram Sabhas and village panchayats in the said Adivasi-majority Scheduled Areas with greater powers — which includes mandatory consultation before land acquisition for development projects or grant of prospecting licences, mining leases and concessions for exploitation of minor minerals. The stated objective is to institutionalise self-rule and tribal people’s participation in decision making. PESA, thus, puts control over jal (water), jangal (forests) and jamin (land) with the Gram Sabha or the general assembly of voters in a village panchayat. But how has PESA worked on the ground? Section 4(i) of PESA requires the Gram Sabha or “the Panchayats at the appropriate level” to be consulted prior to making land acquisition or undertaking resettlement and rehabilitation of persons affected by development projects in the Scheduled Areas. The Gujarat government has used the flexibility conferred by the law to delegate powers under this section not to the Gram Sabha, but to the intermediate tier of Taluka Panchayats. Section 4(m), likewise, covers subjects such as ownership of minor forest produce and powers to prevent alienation of land in Scheduled Areas and to even restore such lands to Adivasis. These functions have again been given not to the Gram Sabha, but to the Taluka or Zilla panchayats. An example of the loose implementation of the provisions that empower PRIs is the manner in which land resources have been directly or indirectly transferred at throwaway rates to industry. Rajesh Bhat has shown that the village panchayats in Gujarat have been paid a measly 0.3 per cent of the compensatory share on sale of gauchar or common grazing lands. In a state with already stretched fodder resources, the land available with the village panchayats is obviously not enough to sustain the existing cattle population. One shouldn’t be surprised if this has turned into a major source of dissatisfaction amongst the various cattle-rearing communities — and found expression through the electronic voting machines! Gujarat is clearly a state — it is admittedly not the only one — where the Panchayati Raj system enabling participatory democracy at the local level has not been allowed to flourish. Like in most other states, the mind-set of political leaders and the bureaucracy has been one of we-know-better, which has, however, proved detrimental to the autonomy and functioning of PRIs. If the ruling party had put its dictum of ‘Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas’ or inclusive development into practice, the results of the latest polls might have been better.
