Military Digest I Exercise Trishul creates scare in Pakistan just as BRASS TACKS IV did in 1987

BRASS TACKS IV and CIA analysis

Archival documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America (USA) reveal that detailed papers on the exercise had been prepared well before the actual event in January 1987. In an internal memo in November 1986, the CIA laid out its analysis of Exercise BRASS TACKS IV.

The memo prepared by Richard J Kerr, the then Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, stated that the Indian Army would begin its largest-ever field manoeuvres in January (1987) near the Pakistani border. “Although the size of this exercise – codenamed BRASS TACKS IV – is unprecedented, we believe the exercise fits the Indian Army’s standard annual training cycle, is well designed to meet the new Chief of Staff’s goal of challenging the conservative thinking of his senior officers, and is not a prelude to war,” it stated.

The CIA report said that despite some Pakistani concerns over the exercise, senior Pakistani officials were downplaying an imminent attack. Instead, Islamabad appeared to be using BRASS TACKS IV to strengthen its case for increased US military support, it added.

The BRASS TACKS Exercises

BRASS TACKS IV was the final sequence in a series of four exercises that began in the summer of 1986. BRASS TACKS I and II were conducted in July and November as command post exercises designed to test the administrative, communication, and logistics skills of senior Indian Army commanders.

The CIA believed that BRASS TACKS III would consist of division-level manoeuvres held sometime in December 1986 in preparation for BRASS TACKS IV in January 1987. “BRASS TACKS IV will take place in the first three months of 1987 in India’s northern Rajasthan training area. The exercise will involve two opposing corps-level forces –including the Army’s two armored divisions and its single mechanized division – consisting of about 150,000 troops, 1,500 tanks, and 500 artillery pieces.

“The Indian Air Force and Navy will be conducting exercises simultaneously with BRASS TACKS IV, including air support missions in Rajasthan and an amphibious landing near Goa,” the CIA memo said.

Analysing the Indian intentions behind the exercise, the CIA believed that BRASS TACKS IV fitted the Indian Army’s standard annual training cycle. It said that the Indian Army normally concluded its training cycle in the months of January and February with corps or multi-corps exercises in Rajasthan. “In 1982 and 1984, these maneuvers involved about 100,000 men, including the Army’s newly formed mechanized division in 1984. The Indians also routinely prioritize rail traffic in the Punjab, the major transit route between most Army units and the Rajasthan training area, for military needs in the weeks preceding their large-scale maneuvers.

“There was a brief exercise-related disruption of Punjab rail traffic earlier this month, but this traffic already has been resumed. This disruption caused a stir in the press where it was misinterpreted to mean that Indians had begun large-scale troops movements in Punjab,” the CIA memo said.

CIA’s assessment of Gen Sundarji’s intent

The memo said that BRASS TACKS IV was designed to cater to the then Army Chief’s goal of challenging the conservative thinking of his senior officers. This heavily redacted portion of this archived document goes on to say that upon assuming office as Chief of Army Staff, Gen Sundarji began making major efforts to develop the skills of his officers, especially the division and corps commanders, to keep pace with the requirements of the growing and expanding Indian Army. “We believe involving the mechanized division and both armored divisions in BRASS TACKS IV is designed primarily to confront its participants, experienced mainly in infantry operations, with the rigors of armored warfare,” the memo said.

War?

The CIA analysis said the evidence indicated that the BRASS TACKS exercises were not a prelude to war.

“The Rajasthan training area is about 400km south of the more traditional Indian invasion routes into Pakistan and, in a defensive scenario, 600km south of the most likely Pakistani area of attack in Kashmir. An Indian attack on Pakistan from Rajasthan would require Indian forces to cross the widest stretch of desert between the two countries where few roads exist. So far, an insufficient number of air defense and field artillery units are being deployed to support combat operations and no forward consolidation of ammunition, fuel, or other supplies is being made,” the note analysed.

Pakistani reaction

Just as Pakistan has adjusted its deployments in reaction to Exercise Trishul, it did the same with BRASS TACKS IV. There was apprehension among the Pakistan military and political hierarchy about the Indian intent, as they had not been notified about the manoeuvres at that point in time.

Some Pakistani Army units – including its two armoured divisions –were deployed for their annual exercises opposite the Rajasthan training area and in Kashmir. However, the CIA noted that these deployments were consistent with the normal training cycle, and many border observation posts remained unmanned.