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Journalism of Courage
Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk will be meeting Prime Minister Narendra Modi today (November 7) after a historic three-day visit to Assam. Despite the 265.8 km border shared by Assam and Bhutan, this marked the first visit of a Bhutanese monarch to the state.
The visit was also significant as it came after a tense period, in which the peaceful relationship between the neighbours became complicated in the 1990s when insurgent groups from Assam began setting up camps and operating out of forests in southeast Bhutan.
This was also noted by Dawa Penjor, General Secretary of the Bhutan India Friendship Association, in his note on the King’s visit stating that “the strong bond between Bhutan and Assam faced a challenging test from various insurgent groups along their shared border for nearly two decades.”
As a result, the hill kingdom was pushed to undertake its first military operation in 140 years to flush out the militants from its territory. ‘Operation All Clear’ was launched by the Royal Bhutan Army on December 15, 2003, and dealt a crippling blow to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), which had set up camps in Bhutanese territory.
In the 1990s, the Indian military and Assam police launched successive crackdowns against militant groups in Assam, putting them under pressure. At the same time, Bangladesh ceased to be a place of refuge as well, with the pro-India Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina coming to power in 1996 and taking action against them.
As a consequence, these groups set up camps in southeast Bhutan, particularly in the Samdrup Jongkhar district that borders Assam. According to the Bhutan government, at the time of its crackdown, there were 13 ULFA camps, 12 NDFB camps and 5 KLO camps in its territory (this organisation was mostly active in West Bengal).
What was Bhutan’s initial approach towards these militant groups?
While Bhutan ignored and did not engage with the Indian insurgents in its territories in the initial years, pressure began to mount on it as it began to strain diplomatic relationships with India – its neighbour, biggest funder and trade partner.
Bhutan had entered into dialogue with these groups in 1998 but still been reluctant to take coercive action to drive them out, a major factor in which was the small size and inexperience of its military. However, the talks did not yield any outcome for the government despite five rounds of talks with the ULFA and three rounds with the NDFB. The smallest of the three groups, the KLO snubbed the efforts at dialogue.
What finally led to the crackdown?
On the day of its crackdown, the Royal Bhutan Government laid out all the factors that pushed it to military action against the insurgents, underlining that their presence had become a “direct threat to Bhutan’s sovereignty and national security.”
“Of particular concern, are the misperceptions surrounding their presence and the implications on the excellent bilateral relations with India, which is of the highest importance for the Royal Government and the Bhutanese people,” the statement by the government said.
It stated that apart from this, the groups’ presence had taken a toll on development and economic activities in Bhutan, including the stalling of the Dungsam Cement Project, as well as the closure of education institutes in vulnerable areas.
“Innocent peoples in Assam, West Bengal, as well as in Bhutan, have been victims of threats, coercion, and extortion. Unprovoked attacks by militants against Bhutanese nationals inside the country, as well as while travelling through Assam have resulted in tragic loss of innocent lives. It has become unsafe for Bhutanese to travel and transport goods through the traditional and more convenient routes in India,” it has stated.
Political Science professor and researcher Arijit Mazumdar wrote in his paper ‘Bhutan’s Military Action Against Indian Insurgents’ that another major factor had been fears in Bhutan. It was felt that the insurgent groups would supply arms to the ethnic Nepalese Lhotshampas, who were subjected to repressive policies by the royal government, fuelling an ethnic insurgency in southern Bhutan.
In the Bhutan Royal Assembly session of June-August 2003, a resolution was taken that the government would make one last attempt to persuade the militants to leave the country, failing which the Royal Bhutan Army would be responsible for removing them. In talks over October and November led by Prime Minister Jigme Thinley, ULFA and NDFB leaders were told that Bhutan “cannot tolerate their presence any longer” while the KLO continued to snub talks.
What was the result of the operation?
On 15 December, the 6000-member Royal Bhutan Army launched simultaneous attacks on the camps of all three outfits with logistical and medical assistance from the Indian Army, which also sealed the Indo-Bhutan border to prevent militants from escaping into India.
In January 2004, India’s Chief of Army Staff General N.C. Vij claimed that at least 650 insurgents from the three groups had been either killed or captured. Among the top leaders captured included ULFA idealogue and founding member Bhimkanta Buragohain, ULFA publicity secretary Mithinga Daimary, KLO crack squad chief Tom Adhikary, KLO second in command Milton Burman and NDFB publicity chief B. Erakdao.
