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In these early days at least, the fresh ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is holding.
Principally, the (unpublished) ceasefire mimics UNSC Resolution 1701, which was adopted in the wake of the 2006 conflict. Hezbollah is supposed to withdraw to the north of the Litani river, Israel to the south of the Blue Line, with the Lebanese Army remaining as the only armed force allowed between the two in South Lebanon. It gives both forces 60 days to withdraw to their respective positions.
A crucial novelty in the agreement is the addition of the United States and France to the tripartite mechanism of Lebanon, Israel, and the UNIFIL that oversees the implementation of UNSCR 1701. Notably, it does not call for a complete disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon, north of the Litani, while Israel proclaimed that it retains the right to strike again if Hezbollah violates the agreement (something that the Lebanese government rejects).
Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has outlined three reasons for the ceasefire — to focus on Iran, to give Israeli forces “a breather and replenish stocks”, and to “separate” the Hamas and Hezbollah fronts by taking one of them out of the war. Indeed, Hezbollah had opened a parallel front to support Hamas just days after the latter’s terror attack, and the beginning of Israel’s bombardment of Gaza.
Three further factors might have influenced Israel’s decision.
FIRST, there has evidently been at least a mild fracture in Israel’s civil-military framework. Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (along with the IDF Chief of Staff) had been pressing for a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon. He had repeatedly questioned Netanyahu’s political and military objectives, as well as vociferously called for clarity on a day-after plan from the government.
While Gallant was fired less than a week publicly expressing his disagreement with the prime minister, it is evident that the IDF thinking that he represented, has prevailed to some degree. Note that far-right national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir (the sole dissenter during the cabinet’s vote on the ceasefire), has long hankered against Gallant’s views, along with representatives of towns in Northern Israel who opposed the ceasefire till the end.
SECOND, Israel’s experience of fighting in Lebanon has always been tactically effective but strategically bitter.
A long-term military presence in Lebanon would severely wear down the IDF. This is perhaps why it kept its initial objectives, outlined on October 1, vague in military terms to allow for a withdrawal whenever Hezbollah was deemed to be weakened enough for Israelis living in the North to return to their homes.
Continued Israeli presence in South Lebanon would also enable a stronger re-consolidation of support for Hezbollah within Lebanon (which had been facing significant popular domestic resistance by mid-2023).
THIRD, despite the loss of its entire senior leadership and significant loss of infrastructure, Hezbollah evidently maintained the ability to strike Israel until the end. Its most extensive bombardment of Israel — with 250 rockets — occurred less than two days before the ceasefire, and after Israel’s strike on central Beirut killed at least 29 people, including health workers.
Even with the IDF being militarily superior, Hezbollah’s fighting capacity would ensure a protracted war. The IDF pressed for a ceasefire almost hours after it reached the Litani river, achieving what might be seen at least as a symbolic victory.
The most important underpinning to every development around Israel across the past year, has been the fact that October 7 decimated Israeli perceptions of security. This is what drove Israel to unleash a literal firestorm first in Gaza, and then in Lebanon.
International pressure on Israel has been concerted, with the United Nations’ experts characterising Israel’s acts as a “genocide”, the International Court of Justice calling for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories, and the International Criminal Court issuing an arrest warrant against Netanyahu. This has evidently not stopped Israel from pushing on in Gaza, as Israel now views this as its ultimate quest for complete security against all threats; a new “never again”.
That said, the strong dent in Netanyahu’s image as “Mr Security” still lingers, and Israel’s threat perception has usually not differentiated between any of the Iran-sponsored groups. It is curious then that the post-ceasefire status quo post-bellum uncannily resembles the state of affairs at the end of the 34-day Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. (The current invasion spanned 57 days.)
Then too the Lebanese Army was mandated to be the only armed force between the Litani and Blue lines post the ceasefire; its heavy armament and troop trucks rolled into the effective buffer zone by August of 2006. The American addition to the new “tripartite+” arrangement in 2024, that is supposed to differentiate it from the 2006 predicament, has come with explicit non-commitment of any combat troops, which is arguably also more palatable for the incoming Donald Trump administration in Washington DC.
However, Hezbollah still remains entrenched in Lebanon’s society and government, with 15 members in Parliament and an ally in the Speaker’s office. Notwithstanding the fillip of Western presence in ceasefire oversight, Hezbollah can now shift to regaining its socio-political base, having forced Israel again to withdraw as it did in 2006.
Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah on Tuesday vowed to “carry on resistance”, adding that the force that was “fighting in the battlefield will itself help to rebuild”.
Two things.
FIRST, the acceptance on the part of Lebanon and Hezbollah of even a cursory US presence in South Lebanon, could not have occurred without Hezbollah Chief Naim Qassem (who televised his acceptance to the US-proposed ceasefire draft at least a week ago) consulting Tehran.
As Iran engages the IAEA, keeps up a steady stream of signals to engage the United States for sanctions relief, and deepens its (well-reciprocated) rapprochement with its Arab neighbours, the country no longer has to worry about what seemed to be an existential threat to its largest proxy in the region, at least momentarily in early October. It is useful to remember that Iran’s principal objective in raising and sustaining Hezbollah is to ensure a military buffer between itself and Israel, despite the Palestine-linked framing of Iranian support to the resistance.
SECOND, Israel can now ensure complete military focus on not just Hamas in Gaza, but also Iranian proxies in Syria (which includes Hezbollah and allied troops), Iraq, and Yemen for the first time since the beginning of its campaign in Gaza. Netanyahu’s address specifically warned that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is “playing with fire”. With Iran indicating some measure of restraint and preparing for a Trump administration, Israel retains the option to both continue striking Iranian proxies, or to meet restraint with restraint, as it focuses on Gaza where the death toll is now touching 45,000.
In the Lebanon theatre specifically, however, all elements of conflict that sparked this latest war remain. Much more water has to flow down the Litani before complete stability is guaranteed in Lebanon and North Israel.
The author is a Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.
