Three years after 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a clash with the Chinese army at Galwan at the Line of Actual Control, the tensions in the relationship arising out of China’s incursions in April 2020 are no closer to resolution. The Chinese project then was to make unilateral changes to the LAC. The disengagement by troops at five “friction” points — at Galwan after the deadly clash on June 15, 2020; on the north and south banks of Pangong Lake in February 2021; at Patrolling Point 17 in the Gogra-Hot Spring in August 2021, and PP15 in September 2022 — came through 18 rounds of talks between the area military commanders of both sides. De-escalation has not taken place. Chinese actions of rapidly scaling up war-like infrastructure along the LAC do not inspire confidence that it will ever go back to the cold border it was despite the fundamental cartographic problems that have dogged it since 1949. Vindication for this concern came with an attempt by the PLA to spring a surprise on a forward post in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, territory that is claimed by China as part of Tibet, last December. Thanks to lessons learnt in the eastern Ladakh area, the attempt was thwarted. China now seems to believe that the disengagement was the resolution, as evident from the message conveyed by the Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu, during a meeting with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh two months ago.
In the process of disengagement, India stepped back from areas where it was previously patrolling to create a demilitarised buffer zone at the five points where the Chinese intrusion had taken place. It is unclear if Indian access to areas in this buffer zone will be restored. In official communication with the Chinese, India has stopped using the phrase “return to status quo” as it existed on April 2020. Both sides have decided that the intrusions in the Depsang Plains and in Demchok are “legacy issues” and need not be taken up now.
At this point, as India and China continue high-level engagement at regional fora such as the SCO and BRICS groupings, it is hard to fathom what a resolution might look like. Meanwhile, bilateral trade continues to touch new heights with India importing more than ever before from the Asian giant. As Delhi and Washington find closer alignment — Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to the US may bring greater defence co-operation — and seek to “compete” with Beijing through the Quad, India would do well not to see its own problems with China at the long land border through the American security lens focussed on the Taiwan Strait.
