There are times when a brand acquires a symbolism that far exceeds its real significance. Consider the global political excitement surrounding the BRICS on the eve of the just concluded Johannesburg summit. Many in the Global South have seen the summit as an opportunity to build a new platform to address their economic concerns after the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. If rising resentment in the Global South led to the investment of new hopes in the BRICS, there were fears in the West about the BRICS upending the post-World War II global order. Both the hope and the fear appear misplaced. All the pre-summit hype about a common BRICS currency to replace the dollar, for example, ended in tame statements about trading in national currencies — which are, in any case, pegged against the US dollar.
Although it may not shatter the current global order, the BRICS brand has attracted many countries that want to demonstrate their strategic autonomy and stand up to western pressures. The clamour to join the BRICS became intense as 22 countries applied for membership. The Johannesburg summit took a major decision on expanding the forum. It invited six countries — Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — to become full members starting early 2024. This is the first expansion since the 2010 admission of South Africa into the BRICS and there could be further expansion of membership and creation of a new category of “partner states”. The BRICS foreign ministers have been tasked to develop criteria and norms for further institutional expansion of the forum.
There is a widespread perception that the expansion is a political triumph for China and Russia, which want to see the BRICS become a counter to the G7, and a setback to India, which was said to be unenthusiastic about expansion. This is a misreading of the situation. There is no doubt that China was the one that initiated the expansion move. India did not oppose this but wanted clarity on the criteria. The real bargaining in the BRICS is about whom to admit; current members appear to have got their special friends in. This is unlikely to make the BRICS more efficient. The larger membership will make it harder to produce a purposeful common agenda. If the Johannesburg summit produced a joint statement — a laundry list that ran into 94 paras — imagine what a more diverse group of 11 countries might do when they gather at a summit. The BRICS began nearly two decades ago as a forum with one clear objective — to promote a multipolar world. Given the wide range of differences among its current and incoming members, however, it could well turn into a sack of potatoes that is impossible to turn into a sharp geopolitical instrument. China might have had its wish for expansion granted, but the results could be very different from Beijing’s expectations. Many present and new members have strong ties to the West and are unlikely to toe the Chinese line. Meanwhile, one major impact of the BRICS brand is already here: The growing recognition in the West that it must end the prolonged political neglect of the Global South.
