Of the several structural problems that have hindered efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict in Manipur, two have proven particularly difficult to address. The first is the de facto segregation of the Meiteis and the Kukis, with buffer zones guarded by central forces, coming in the way of free movement across the state. The second is the re-militarisation by both communities, compounded by the inability of both the Centre (which has been in charge since February this year via President’s Rule) and the erstwhile state government to contain the violence. On both fronts, however, there are signs of progress. Ahead of PM Modi’s scheduled visit later this month, his first since the conflict began, the Ministry of Home Affairs last week announced two significant developments: The renewal of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with Kuki militant groups, and that Kuki groups had “decided to open National Highway-02”.
It will not be easy, as is evident from signs of discontent among both the Meiteis and the Kukis. In the valley, COCOMI, an Imphal-based Meitei organisation, condemned the renewal of the SoO agreement, alleging that it legitimises the militant groups. In the hills, the Kuki-Zo Council issued a statement claiming that NH-02 was never blocked and insisting on maintaining the “sanctity of buffer zones.” Meanwhile, the United Naga Council has announced a “trade embargo” beginning September 8 to protest the fencing of the India-Myanmar border and the scrapping of the Free Movement Regime. This could jeopardise the progress made on free movement, as NH-02 runs through the Naga-dominated Senapati district. If Manipur is to break free from militia-driven politics, the new agreement will need to serve as the basis for a political dialogue that addresses the deeper issues sustaining the conflict. The PM’s visit comes at a critical moment, when the prospect of resolution exists, but only if the opportunity is seized.
