Making sense of US President Donald Trump’s latest move — sending “tariff letters” to countries including long-standing Asian allies like Japan and South Korea — requires understanding the profound internal changes in America and their impact on the global order. Some interpret Trump’s actions as mere pressure tactics against trade partners. Others argue it was never realistic for Washington to negotiate separate trade agreements with every country. Trump has repeatedly said he would unilaterally set tariffs for most nations while striking deals selectively. As this column goes to press, India is in the second category and might see an interim agreement announced soon. (So is Pakistan, which is hopeful of securing a trade deal! Bangladesh is in the first category with a 35 per cent tariff rate.)
Yet these developments should not distract India’s elite from grappling with the deeper forces shaping Trump’s worldview — a set of radical ideas that are shaking the international system to its foundations. In two seminal essays in Foreign Affairs, Michael Beckley of Tufts University gives us one perspective on this tumultuous American change. He points to the potential rise of the United States as a “rogue superpower”.
Beckley first advanced his argument during Trump’s first term, when the President openly challenged core principles of US foreign policy: Economic globalisation, security alliances, and openness to immigration. Back then, Trump’s inexperience and the constraints imposed by the Washington establishment tempered many of his instincts.
In his second term, however, Trump is less constrained and commands near-total dominance over a political system the American founding fathers designed precisely to prevent the concentration of power in a single individual or party. One might argue that Trump’s defiance of this constitutional structure is a passing phase. But for now, he has a free hand to pursue policies on three of his core priorities: Trade, international security, and immigration — heralding the “age of American unilateralism”.
Crucially, Beckley contends that Trump is not the source of this new American orientation but rather a catalyst for a deeper transformation rooted in structural features of the US’s position in the world. Since the end of World War II, US foreign policy has been framed as a choice between global leadership and isolationism. Beckley argues that the Trump years have revealed a third path: America as a rogue superpower — abandoning any pretence of global stewardship, scorning multilateral institutions, and pursuing its interests in a brutally transactional fashion.
This new unilateralism is grounded in America’s “autonomy”. Unlike ageing allies in Europe and Asia or rivals like Russia and China, the US enjoys distinct advantages: A relatively young and growing population supporting strong consumer demand and economic resilience; technological leadership in artificial intelligence, robotics, and automation enabling the reshoring of manufacturing and reducing dependence on global supply chains; and self-sufficiency in energy. Moreover, while the US economy is less reliant on exports, the rest of the world depends heavily on selling goods and services to American consumers. It is this asymmetry Trump sees as powerful leverage to reshape the global economic order that America itself built and nurtured over decades.
America’s unilateralism has also been reinforced by the political coalition behind Trump’s rise. The MAGA movement argues that globalisation has hollowed out American manufacturing and betrayed working people. It opposes security alliances and views them as a burden. It resents Washington’s “endless wars” fought in the name of global leadership. For this coalition, defending America’s borders against illegal immigration takes priority over defending distant allies. Tellingly, Trump’s latest budget allocates $37 billion to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — nearly half of India’s defence budget and larger than Italy’s entire defence spending. ICE’s increasingly aggressive tactics to round up and deport migrants would make many a third-world tinpot dictator envious.
The US is likely to remain the world’s preeminent power for the foreseeable future. China’s rapid rise once led to predictions that it would overtake the US in aggregate GDP this decade. That now seems less likely. US GDP stands near $30 trillion, compared to China’s $20 trillion and the EU’s roughly similar level. If the Trump administration’s projections of 3 per cent annual growth for the US economy hold, the gap will only widen.
How should Delhi navigate this complex moment in America’s evolution? For one, Delhi already recognises that an unconstrained Trump is driving momentous global shifts that require major intellectual and policy adaptation in India. To its credit, Delhi has gone further than ever to negotiate a trade agreement with Washington and has learned to manage Trump’s anti-immigration agenda.
Second, despite Trump’s often provocative pronouncements — on everything from trade to Indo-Pak peace — Delhi has maintained composure. Indian policymakers are acutely aware of the gap between signals from the White House and the rest of the US government. Staying engaged with the broader American establishment is essential to steady the relationship amid turbulence.
Third, India has intensified its engagement with other major powers, both bilaterally and through forums like BRICS. The rhetoric at BRICS might suggest a return to the “glorious days” of the Non-Aligned Movement and the pursuit of a collective confrontation with the US. Sceptics, however, see Delhi as being as cynical as Beijing and Moscow in betting that bilateral deals with Washington matter more than grandstanding in multilateral gatherings. In other words, Delhi is not about to revive the foreign policy adventurism of the past.
One shortcoming of India’s approach is the limited appreciation of how US politics is reshaping its foreign, economic, and security policy. Filling this gap demands a wider circle of Indian engagement within America’s political system and the policy class. India needs American interlocutors who can do more than lament Delhi’s “illiberal turn” and can explain America’s own march away from liberalism. India needs friends who can go beyond objecting to India’s “lack of commitment” to the US partnership and illuminate why Trump reserves his harshest criticism for America’s long-standing allies. India needs American experts who can move beyond criticising Delhi’s “Moscow connection” and help unpack Trump’s reasons for sparing Russia from the tariff wars. Put simply, Delhi needs more intellectual investment in the study of American affairs at home and a more diverse class of experts in the US to engage with.
The writer is distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi, and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
