It might take years to build something, but just a few days to destroy it. Mutual trust, in particular, is hard to arrive at, especially between sovereigns. But a few words and actions could just shatter it in a brief moment. That is precisely what Donald Trump has done to India-US relations. In a barrage of daily commentary, in the past few days, Trump has undermined carefully developed political understandings on key issues, especially on Kashmir and Pakistan.
It is worth recalling that Trump’s first administration had an important part in building this trust since the turn of the 21st century. Beginning with the Kargil War of 1999, the US moved away from its historical tilt towards Pakistan on the Kashmir question during the Cold War. Since then, the administrations of George W Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden have stuck to a policy of de-hyphenation of relations between India and Pakistan, and emphasising bilateral dialogue between Delhi and Rawalpindi rather than US mediation on the Kashmir question.
In the wake of the Pulwama terror attack and India’s Balakot strikes in February 2019, under the Trump administration, the US stepped in to stop the escalation and persuaded the Pakistan army to release the Indian pilot who had bailed out across the border, but there was no talk of mediation or a reference to the Kashmir question. When India changed the constitutional status of Kashmir in August 2019, and Pakistan sought to raise the issue with the help of China at the United Nations Security Council, the Trump administration helped block the initiative. Given this background, it is indeed disturbing to see Trump’s approach to the India-Pakistan crisis this time around.
It was tempting to dismiss Trump’s credit-taking for the ceasefire and his claims that he had leveraged trade ties with India to promote peace as a mere reflection of his well-known penchant for self-serving interpretations of facts. Even more bizarre was his talk of equating trade possibilities with India (GDP of $4 trillion and annual trade of over $1 trillion) with Pakistan (GDP of $350 billion and yearly trade of about $90 billion). The change is too stark to ignore. Some factors driving this change are evident.
There was indeed a fully-staffed “administration” during Trump’s first term (2017-21). It produced a formal South Asia policy (August 2017) that targeted Pakistan for playing both sides of the street in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. The National Security Strategy issued by his administration at the end of 2017 underlined the importance of India in the emerging US quest to rebalance Asia. That confirmed the unfolding “India first” policy in the US’s approach to South Asia and the deeper bilateral strategic ties in the broader Indo-Pacific framework created by the Trump administration in November 2017.
This time, though, Trump seems to be the sole shaper of US policy around the world; the traditional “system” that develops policy and executes it through its multiple agencies seems conspicuous by its absence. Many senior staff positions in the administration are yet to be filled, and there appears to be little process in developing positions. Trump is everything.
Even more importantly, none of the familiar markers of US foreign policy, even those developed in his first term, are considered sacrosanct by Trump in his second term. Trump believes he is bound by nothing from the past and that he is reinventing US engagement with the world. If Trump’s national security strategy talked of the return of America’s great power rivalry with China and Russia, this time around, he talks about collaboration with Beijing and Moscow in Europe and Asia. Especially troubling is the vanishing line between Trump’s personal interests and the state interests of the US. In accepting a $400 million luxury jumbo jet from the Qatari royal family, Trump has emphasised that he makes his own rules for the White House protocols.
The driving force behind Trump’s new enthusiasm for Pakistan is unclear. It is not easy to verify the media speculation that the Trump family’s newfound business interests in Pakistan in the crypto sector have become an important factor in shaping the US approach to the latest India-Pakistan crisis.
How should India respond to the new South Asian dynamic in Trump’s White House? Four features of an Indian strategy in dealing with the Trump disruption stand out.
First, there is no reason for Delhi to be rattled. India has dealt with far bigger crises with the United States over the years. It resisted the Clinton administration’s attempt to make the Kashmir question the main agenda of US policy in the 1990s. It worked with successive US administrations to resolve the complex bilateral dispute over India’s nuclear weapons programme. India has managed to defuse several minor crises in the relationship over the past quarter-century.
Second, Delhi has recognised getting into a daily political argument with Trump’s statements would be counterproductive. Delhi continues to engage with the Trump administration on different issues on their merits. Underlying this approach is the reality that India is much stronger and more self-assured than before, when any statement from a minor official would send Delhi into a political tizzy. If you are the fourth-largest economy, it is bound to reflect in the way your government deals with the world, especially the unpleasant situations.
Third, Trump might loom large over America today, but Trump is not America. The White House has enormous power in the US system, but there are other powerful actors, too. India has had considerable experience over the past few decades in engaging the diverse elements of the US government, which includes the US Congress, its political class and civil society. The coming days will see India stepping up this effort. American business is a powerful factor shaping the government policies in Washington and Delhi must step up its engagement with American corporations to protect its interests in Washington. China has long demonstrated that US business is the best ally in coping with frequent political turbulence in American domestic politics. Delhi also knows that political cycles in the US are terribly short, and Trump’s current hegemony over the political system is beginning to show strains as he gets past the honeymoon period of a new presidency.
Fourth, while the US is the most important strategic partner for India, it is not the only one. India’s partnership with Europe has been gaining ground rapidly in recent years. In the recent crisis over Kashmir, some European countries, especially France, Greece and Denmark, have lent valuable diplomatic support in managing the international fallout. More important, the grievances of US allies in Europe and Asia are much larger than those of India. For, Trump’s policies test the fundamental assumptions of the Eurasian allies about their external relations. As US allies seek to diversify their partnerships, India could find considerable common ground with them.
Amid the current alarm in Delhi at Trump’s policies, it is important not to forget that structural and systemic convergences between India and the US are deep. The task of Indian strategy is to protect them from Trump through more intensive engagement with US domestic politics. At the same time, Delhi needs to build on the emerging possibilities with other powers. Above all, India must bet big on its domestic industrial and technical capabilities that have proved themselves in Operation Sindoor. Long overdue reform at home that unleashes India’s productive capabilities must be the highest priority for the government. Internal rejuvenation, in the end, is the most important guarantee against unexpected external changes.
The writer is a distinguished fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research and contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
