Art of the Deal

Given its size — worth more than $10 billion — and the expansive international interest in it,the deal has certainly attracted widespread attention. Yet,there has been little informed assessment of the factors that will make up India’s final decision. Tellis plugs this huge gap with his incisive yet accessible analysis.

Although India has been one of the world’s major importers of weapons for decades,the quality of the nation’s internal debate on defence purchases has been pitiful. This has been especially true since the 1980s scandal on the purchase of the Bofors gun that helped defeat Rajiv Gandhi and continues to haunt the Congress party quarter of a century later. The obsessive focus on corruption has indeed paralysed decision-making — at the level of civilian bureaucracy and political leadership — on issues relating to the modernisation of the Indian military forces. As a result,Indian armed forces are today under-equipped and in danger of falling behind their regional rivals.

Unlike in the 1990s when India was strapped financially and had to put defence modernisation on the back burner,money is no longer the problem. In the past,the source of international supply of arms was limited to Russia,a few West European nations and Israel. With the United States now emerging as a new source for advanced conventional weapons,India’s options on the global arms market have expanded considerably.

With a severe recession affecting most arms manufacturers,India has never enjoyed the kind of leverage it can exercise today in the choice of weapons,price,terms of technology transfer,and the prospects for building a strong base for defence industrial production at home. If the big question is whether Indian defence policymakers are smart enough to take advantage,the MMRCA decision is indeed the decisive test.

Last year,the IAF has completed field trials of six jet fighters — two US fighters,F16 and F-18,the French Rafael,Europe’s Eurofighter,the Russian MiG-35 and Sweden’s Gripen. It is now the turn of the defence bureaucracy and the political leadership to make the final call.

Tellis offers three important recommendations for India — don’t delay the decision,don’t split the deal between different vendors,and do it right by the needs of the Indian Air Force,by effectively integrating judgments on technical performance,cost and geopolitical considerations.

“If Washington wants an American aircraft to win the game,” Tellis suggests,the US “will need to offer generous terms on the transfer of technology,assure India access to fifth-generation US combat aircraft,and provide strong support for India’s strategic ambitions.”

Whether one agrees with Tellis or not,there is no denying that he raises the bar on the MMRCA discourse and offers a rigorous template for public debate on India’s defence purchases. Anyone interested in India’s defence modernisation and its fighter aircraft decision will find Tellis’ new monograph a necessary and insightful read.