Nepal’s red rag: China, Pak on India’s border

While King Gyanendra might hope that his threat to draw in China and Pakistan would force New Delhi to soften its policies, the indications are that the move could further undermine the limited support the monarchy enjoys in New Delhi.

Last week, the Chinese media quoted Sun Heping, Beijing’s ambassador to Nepal, as saying that the request to open a Consulate General’s office at Biratnagar could be considered after consultations with the Nepalese government. Friends of the monarchy in Nepal, who have been campaigning for stronger ties with Beijing, have floated the idea of a Chinese consulate in Biratnagar. The case for Chinese diplomatic presence at Biratnagar is being made in the context of the broader demand for a highway between Tibet and Eastern Nepal along the Kosi river. Ambassador Sun told a Nepalese audience last month that Beijing has given a “high priority” for the construction of the Kosi corridor, which could emerge an important road link between Tibet and eastern sub-continent. Sun, however, insisted that Nepal must first “request the Chinese authorities officially for the construction of the highway.” On the consulate at Biratnagar, Sun said, “If the proposal comes to the embassy, it can be negotiated with the Foreign Ministry of Nepal,” Sun added.

Meanwhile, Pakistan wants to match India by setting up a consulate at Birganj near the Bihar border where India has set up a recent mission. While the logic of the Indian consulate in central Terai was dictated by the massive economic and human relationships across the border, Islamabad’s interest appears more political.

India suspects that Pakistan, which shares neither a border nor any substantive trade with the Himalayan Kingdom, is only interested in fomenting trouble on the open border between India and Nepal. Anti-India activities of Pakistan’s embassy in Kathmandu has long been a major source of concern to New Delhi.

Nepal gave permission to India to open the Birganj consulate a few years ago. This in turn appears to have been the excuse for the monarchy as well as Beijing and Islamabad to expand their own diplomatic presence in the country.

In trying to pressurise India by threatening to draw closer to China and Pakistan, King Gyanendra might end up achieving the opposite—a hardening of Indian positions against him. The few Indian constituencies where the King enjoys support, such as the RSS and sections of the security establishment, might want to draw the line at letting the King facilitate Chinese and Pak activity on the Indo-Nepal border.