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Journalism of Courage
One of the collateral benefits of living in New Delhi is frequent exposure to India’s strategic affairs circuit. Its nodal point is, really, the Ministry of External Affairs. The MEA turns into a frenetic spin doctor each time a new initiative or visit is to be explained, and its wisdom is transmitted through a network of correspondents and commentators.
As spring has given way to summer, the diplomatic calendar has been hyper-busy. In all this, that old rhetorical question, “How many Indians does it take to change a light bulb?”, has found a diplomatic variant: how many strategic partnerships will it take to make India a superpower?
Begin with end March and the visit of the American secretary of state. It left India with the offer of a “strategic partnership”. Shortly afterwards, the Chinese prime minister came along and offered India another “strategic partnership”. Now the Japanese prime minister is here with a third “strategic partnership”.
Next month, the Indian prime minister visits Russia to, no doubt, celebrate an old “strategic partnership”. In 2005, India and Australia could exchange prime ministerial visits and upgrade their “strategic dialogue” to — what else? — a “strategic partnership”.
That aside, a familiar bunch of Cold War nostalgics speaks of a trilateral India-Russia-China “strategic partnership” — as opposed to bilateral strategic partnerships between these countries. Finally, this week, one analyst came close to advocating a strategic partnership with an “European Union seeking to cut its apron strings to America”, a happy occurrence Europhilic Indians have been waiting for since the D-Day landings.
Even if Venezuela and all of Africa have not been strategically partnered yet, that is a whole lot of strategic partnerships to cope with.
The problem of plenty is infectious. Take India’s imminent great power status. America promises to help India “become a major world power in the 21st century”. China has promoted India from “regional power” to “very populous country” that will “play an even bigger role in international affairs”. Japan sees India as both “stabilising power” and “new Asian superpower”.
With breathtaking aplomb, the MEA and its merry band have diligently explained each happening with adjectives such as “significant” and “crucial”. Any suggestion that so many strategic partnerships with so many countries may be contradictory has been pooh-poohed. If you object, you are accused of being unable to “think out of the box”, a catch-all mantra that is now pasted on every wall in South Block.
Does war with nobody automatically mean strategic partnership with everybody? Just what is going on?
As a consequence of its growing economy and political stability, India is being wooed like never before. Its stock markets are attracting even Japanese and Chinese FII. The US sees India as an outsourcing hub as much a huge market for American banks or insurance companies or airlines, a bulwark against Islamist extremism, in Pakistan or Bangladesh or further afield.
There is a degree of competitive, me-too courtship. The Chinese, apart from eyeing Indian commodities for their factories, are worried India will fall to American charms. The Japanese are trying to neutralise the Chinese. It’s a complex but nevertheless heady feeling to be suddenly so desirable.
Yet strategic partners and partnerships necessitate a strategic vision, a clear-headed approach to specific foreign policy aims and goals. Does the MEA have a strategic world view (as things stand, even a strategic Nepal view would be fine)? Perhaps it simply has a menu of strategic world views, one of which is pulled out to suit the visitor of the week.
India ends up doing two things. First, beating about the bush (or Bush). The three-way alliance with Russia and China is humbug. Neither Moscow nor Beijing takes it seriously enough to risk individual equations with Washington. The big choice is between playing batting partner to America — or, if India is feeling particularly masochistic, to China.
Second, India has to guard against complacency. Just because it is being wooed and called a potential power doesn’t mean it will become a power. The US strategic partnership offer, for instance, has spoken of transferring nuclear plants, virtually recognising India as a nuclear-weapons state.
George W. Bush has two years to deliver, before he becomes a lame duck president. He will need to convince the State Department, India-sceptic Congressmen on Capitol Hill, a host of second-rung powers who may think India is getting undue advantage.
Shouldn’t India be taking this with some urgency? Shouldn’t the government be painting the big picture for home opinion? Shouldn’t MEA lobbyists be mollifying potential spoilers, on the Hill and beyond?
Er no; the MEA’s too busy — signing the next strategic partnership with the next visitor who lands at the airport.
