Donald Trump’s CIA Shake-Up: Former intelligence officer on how it will impact the agency’s global ops

Assad: I think that’s actually a really good initial approach, especially for people who are near retirement. If they’re on the cusp or just a year or two away from retirement, this is a good way to decrease the workforce in a first-phase type of approach.

Aiyar: This has also been happening at the same time as another big move by the Trump administration—shutting down USAID. Around the world, USAID has long been talked about as a front for the CIA, or at least as a partner in many of its operations. What are your thoughts on that?

Assad: That is very incorrect. USAID is not a front for the CIA. In fact, there are very specific laws and rules in the US government that the CIA must adhere to. We can never use a cover related to religion or humanitarian assistance because that would put those people in jeopardy overseas. There is absolutely no link between the two.

Prior to joining the CIA, I worked for an international relief and development agency that received both private funding as well as USAID funding. So I can speak from both perspectives. USAID is just as important as intelligence, but they do very different things. We can discuss the pros and cons of this “slash and burn” methodology the Trump administration is using to reprioritize government programs, but the impact will look very different depending on whether you’re talking about the CIA or USAID.

Aiyar: So is this going to have an impact at all? What kind of impact will this have on the CIA’s operations around the world?

Assad: First of all, the CIA is a giant bureaucracy. It is entrenched and large. We always say, “It’s hard to turn the Titanic.” When you have such a massive organization, making changes is very difficult. You can always add programs, but it’s very hard to take them away.

Post-9/11, the CIA went through a hiring surge. The US Congress greenlit an effort to bring in as many people as possible to stop the next terror attack. As a result, many generalists entered the CIA, but they lacked cultural and linguistic expertise—both of which are essential for intelligence operations in foreign lands.

Now, the agency is top-heavy because the people who joined after 9/11 are in management positions. This has slowed down operations. Additionally, because there are so many people who are not particularly good at their jobs or operationally proficient, it has created a toxic work environment. Unfortunately, that drives away the most talented officers. What’s left is mediocrity, held together by a handful of truly skilled and committed professionals. That needs to change.

Aiyar: So what you’re saying is that bureaucratic inefficiencies have had a negative impact on US intelligence operations. Can you give us any examples—specific or general—of how this inefficiency has impacted operations on the ground?

Assad: Essentially, when you have generalists who don’t understand cultural dynamics, you’re not going to run effective operations. Another major issue is the short-term mindset of US intelligence and policymaking.

Let’s compare this with China. China plays the long game when it comes to intelligence, economics, and government programs. The US, by contrast, is only concerned with the next one or two years. This is partly because we are a democracy, while China is not. China can set priorities for the next 50 to 100 years and stick to them. But in the US, we have a presidential turnover every four years, and national priorities shift.

Even worse, inside agencies like the CIA, policies are often shaped by how long someone is in a position. If someone is only in a role for one to four years, their decisions tend to be short-sighted. That’s not the best way to make strategic decisions.

What we need is a smaller, more skilled workforce. If people are retiring, let them go. If they’re close to retirement, let them leave with an appropriate payout. But we also need to be smarter about who we hire and what programs we invest in. The world has changed dramatically post-COVID. Our adversaries—China, Iran—have adapted, but we haven’t. That’s a problem.

Aiyar: This transitional period is sure to have a very disruptive effect on people working in the CIA and FBI. As you said, China, Iran, and Russia are definitely watching closely. What are the global implications of this period of change in the short term?

Assad: That’s a great question. While I advocate for real, substantial change, the other side of the coin is that radical, rapid changes can cause major disruptions.

First, the human impact. When people are worried about losing their jobs, their focus shifts to survival—paying their bills, mortgages, and taking care of their families. They lose focus on their actual mission.

Second, when you dismantle a bureaucracy quickly, you create a power vacuum. Look at what happened in Iraq with de-Ba’athification. Saddam Hussein had built multiple competing intelligence organizations to keep himself in power. When the US removed them all at once, it created the perfect conditions for a sectarian war. Iraqis began fighting for control of their communities, cities, and the entire country. It was a bloodbath.

I’m not saying that’s going to happen in the US, but when there’s a massive power vacuum, it can be filled by problematic elements. We must be careful that in cutting the fat, we don’t destabilize our ability to respond to threats from terrorist groups, Iran, or Russia. We can’t leave ourselves exposed.

As you said, our adversaries are watching. They often understand our weaknesses better than we do, and they will exploit them if given the opportunity. We turned our backs, they turned to China.

Aiyar: Correct, Africa as well. So, given what is happening in the Middle East—Syria, Israel, and so on—given what is happening around the world, and of course at home with you in the US, what would be your prescription? Let’s call it that. If you could, how would you ask the CIA and its leadership to navigate this current global environment?

Assad: Yeah, so I believe that strengthening relationships with countries that value those relationships is really important. There’s been a lot of wasted effort in countries that, at the end of the day, are happy to take money, happy to take development programs, but then turn on us, turn on the US government inside the UN. Every country should act with its own best interest in mind, and the US should be no different.

I’ve seen a lot of USAID programs that invest in countries that, at the end of the day, are not returning the favor in terms of friendship and collaboration, and that’s not getting us anywhere. That’s just throwing money down the drain as far as I’m concerned.

We need to be very strategic to build relationships where both countries benefit—where the United States benefits, and countries like India, Saudi Arabia, and others benefit as well.

Up until the last administration, it’s been very much a one-way street, and that doesn’t make sense.