One can be forgiven for being surprised by the Trump administration’s reported role in helping broker the India-Pakistan ceasefire — something New Delhi categorically denied on May 13 with a spokesperson stating, “any issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir have to be addressed by India and Pakistan bilaterally”. Earlier, even top US officials had signalled that any American involvement in the crisis would be relatively hands-off. Recall President Donald Trump’s comment that “they’ll get it figured out one way or the other”, and Vice President J D Vance’s statement that “we’re not going to get involved in the middle of [a] war that’s fundamentally none of our business”. With US foreign policy prioritising other flashpoints — from the Gaza and Ukraine wars to deepening competition with China — Washington appeared resigned to keeping its distance.
Furthermore, this administration boasts some of Washington’s biggest champions of India. This includes Vance, who told Prime Minister Narendra Modi shortly after the Pahalgam attack that the US would provide “all assistance” to India in the “joint fight against terrorism”, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, last year, when he was still a senator, introduced a bill that called for India to be given the same US ally status as Japan and Israel. These two men were the main drivers of the US response throughout the India-Pakistan crisis.
One might have presumed that the US would sympathise with India’s counterterrorism imperatives, and step back and let it do what it wanted. However, there was always reason to believe the US would be actively engaged. There’s a strong precedent of American diplomatic intervention in India-Pakistan military confrontations. US interests don’t benefit from escalating hostilities between nuclear adversaries. Additionally, this administration, for all its signalling about wanting to avoid foreign entanglements, relishes opportunities to serve as a peace broker. Not surprisingly, Rubio was in touch with his counterparts in New Delhi and Islamabad several times prior to the talks he and Vance held with India and Pakistan that facilitated the ceasefire.
Still, it’s striking how the administration went from merely engaging with both capitals and calling for de-escalation to working around the clock to help broker a ceasefire. There is no indication that the US had a role in the ceasefire discussions themselves. But it appears that its efforts helped pave the way for the two sides to pursue the ceasefire. There are two likely explanations for this.
The first is escalation dynamics. The crisis involved large-scale use of force, relative to what was seen in recent past crises. India’s initial airstrikes — the most intense carried out in Pakistan since 1971 — set the tone. The willingness of each country to send drones and missiles deep into the other’s territory to hit military targets aroused significant concern in Washington. This was the closest India and Pakistan came to war since the Kargil crisis — and possibly the biggest test of nuclear deterrence since each country became a formal nuclear state. As this reality came into sharp relief after several rounds of tit-for-tat strikes, Washington was likely prompted to step in with more urgency.
The nuclear factor is the likely other reason the US intensified its involvement. Washington was likely spooked by two critical developments on May 9: India’s targeting of the Nur Khan airbase in Rawalpindi, which is close to the Strategic Plans Division that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear assets; and Islamabad’s announcement that it would convene a meeting of the National Command Authority, which oversees nuclear policy — that meeting was not held.
That nuclear escalation risks would light a fire under the Americans isn’t surprising: Similar concerns prompted previous US interventions during India-Pakistan crises, including during the Kargil conflict, the 2001-02 standoff, and — according to Mike Pompeo — during the 2019 confrontation (he was then US Secretary of State). Another important question to ask is how the US pitch for a ceasefire managed to succeed. At the time it was made, India-Pakistan tension and military hostilities were at their highest level. It’s not yet clear how Washington paved the way for the ceasefire, but it was likely able to draw on several areas of leverage. One is Rubio and Vance themselves. They’ve emerged as critical foreign policy players in the administration, and they have Trump’s ear. Rubio, who led US engagement with India and Pakistan throughout the crisis, serves concurrently as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. This gave him the authority to engage with a large range of top interlocutors on both sides.
Additionally, Trump claims trade was used as a pressure point: “I said ‘come on. We’re gonna do a lot of trade with you guys. Let’s stop it. If you stop it we’re doing trade, if you don’t stop it we’re not going to do any trade.’” Commercial considerations alone wouldn’t have compelled India and Pakistan to lay down arms. But American officials may have dropped hints that trade talks meant to reduce US tariffs would go better if the fighting stopped.
Furthermore, Washington may have been pushing at an open door at the moment of its intervention. Despite soaring tension and escalating hostilities, New Delhi and Islamabad had arguably reached a point where they could claim victory and opt for off-ramps. India had already hit major terrorist infrastructure sites in Pakistan, and then it targeted Nur Khan, which unnerved Pakistan’s generals. Pakistan claimed to have shot down Indian jets — while India has said that “losses are a part of combat”, and all pilots are back home.
Washington was also advantaged by the fact that New Delhi and Islamabad had already earned considerable domestic political benefits from the crisis, meaning that calling it a day was not going to be politically costly. India’s government, with its high-intensity military actions coupled with its non-military punitive measures against Pakistan, addressed the public’s demand for a muscular response. Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership, unpopular at home, rallied the country around it and gained back goodwill as it countered India’s attacks.
With the crisis having subsided, US officials have moved on. But the ceasefire is fragile, and the next standoff may not be far away. If it arrives, fresh US intervention likely wouldn’t be far away either — especially if nuclear escalation concerns return to the fore.
The writer is a Washington DC-based South Asia analyst and columnist for Foreign Policy magazine
