The phrase “realpolitik is back” has echoed repeatedly over the past three decades, marking significant turning points in the post-Cold War era. From NATO’s intervention in the Balkans to the illegal invasion of Iraq, the Syrian civil war, and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, realpolitik has been used as a shorthand to describe the perceived decline of liberalism and the American-led international order. This recurring invocation of the term reflects a deeper reality: The liberal international order, particularly following the crises in Ukraine and Gaza, is demonstrably on the defensive. This shift suggests a potential transition towards a different international order, one that might be multipolar, multi-civilisational, more East-oriented, and possibly represent a departure from liberal internationalism as a dominant global philosophy. Terms like “revenge of geography,” “deglobalisation,” “world disorder,” and “the return of history” are attempts to capture this significant transformation.
Realpolitik has transcended its association with 19th-century German unification wars and the Cold War. Now, it reflects a confluence of factors: Ideological exhaustion, overstretched military footprints, and economic populism. Once resisted by Anglo-American intellectuals, the term itself has ironically become mainstream in their political discourse. In the First and Second World Wars, realpolitik served as the ideological antithesis to the Anglo-American tradition. Yet, it found an unlikely champion in Henry Kissinger, arguably its most prominent 20th century practitioner, according to many of his students and admirers. Additionally, scholar Hans Morgenthau, another German emigre, played a crucial role in constructing the intellectual framework of realism, synonymous with realpolitik. George Kennan, the architect of the containment doctrine and a voracious critic of American interventions in Vietnam and Iraq, also emerges as a consequential figure in this evolution.
The list of realpolitik thought leaders and practitioners leans towards Western perspectives due to the dominance of Anglo-American thought in media and intellectual discourse. Yet the practice of realpolitik is by no means limited to Western figures; leaders like Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president throughout the 1970s, stand out. Sadat’s realpolitik approach towards Israel and the United States, along with his successful reclamation of Sinai for Egypt — achieved through a blend of limited military action to cross the Suez Canal, diplomatic endeavours to restore Egyptian sovereignty over the entire peninsula and his strategic pivot from the Eastern to the Western camp — highlight his realpolitik credentials.
Sadat is not alone on this list of non-Western practitioners of realpolitik. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India is a veritable avatar of the current realpolitik tradition; he has uprooted India from its Cold War tradition of non-alignment to pursue a strategy of “multialignment” between both the West and the East. Modi maintains strong relations with Moscow while simultaneously pursuing a deepening strategic partnership with Washington and Brussels. Similarly, his foreign policy sees India aligning with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE while maintaining a line of communication and cooperation with Iran. Overall, in a world increasingly characterised by calls to “choose sides,” Modi is successfully charting a course by which India can remain flexible.
Contemporary discussions of non-Western realpolitik-oriented leaders almost always involve mentions of Russia’s Vladimir Putin. However, Putin’s actions in Ukraine complicate this picture; his invasion contradicts the core principles of this approach. His pursuit of a maximalist and unrealistic goal — imposing regime change in Kyiv — broadly impacted the discourse of the conflict since its start. Indeed, international commentators and analysts, even those who are neutral in regard to the conflict, highlight or make mention of “Russian aggression in Ukraine.” Likewise, Putin’s decisions reshaped the narrative surrounding Russia’s international behaviour and radically transformed European security policy, prompting Sweden and Finland to abandon their long-standing neutrality. Beyond territorial gains, the war has resulted in the depletion of Russian military capabilities and manpower while leading to widespread rearmament across Europe. These costly consequences suggest an ideologically-driven imperial war, regardless of the eventual actual boundaries between Russia and Ukraine. Overall, Putin’s actions effectively disqualify him from being considered a realpolitik leader.
Ultimately, while the intellectual origins of realpolitik remain a question of academic debate — with some arguing the concept is a timeless force with a storied tradition, a lineage encompassing figures like Thucydides and Machiavelli, while others see it as a relatively recent European construct — its frequent application in recent decades, and especially in the past few years, points towards a deeper truth: The world unquestionably faces a power transition, shifting away from the established order. This transformation, however, hasn’t yet resulted in the emergence of a fully-formed new world system. While the current system shows signs of strain, its successor remains undefined.
This is the reason why the academic debate over the definition of realpolitik is both contentious and relevant to ongoing political discourse. Regardless of its historical roots, its repeated invocation over the past 30 years reflects a global system in crisis. The resurgence of realpolitik thus can be seen as a search for a term that captures the current disorder: The return of interstate conflicts, the rise of populism, and the resurgence of protectionism. Perhaps, though, it might be more apt to view realpolitik as a placeholder, a marker of our current troubled state of affairs, rather than a fully-formed framework. Only time will tell what the end result will be.
The writer is a director at the Middle East Institute in Washington, a member of McLarty Associates, and a visiting fellow at Third Way
