Opinion Hainan beckons

Over the last decade,China has also made Hainan the voice of Asia in the global economic discourse. Hainan Island now hosts the annual Bo’ao Forum for Asia that brings together Chinese and world leaders — both political and corporate.

A decade after its launch,the Bo’ao forum has become a rival to the celebrated Davos forum in the Swiss Alps,and a place where Asia’s rich and powerful want to be seen. It is only one element of Chinese strategy to convert this sleepy tropical island into a hub of global tourism and the conference circuit.

In a major political decision during 2009,Beijing decided that Hainan would become China’s Hawaii. Since then,the frenetic construction of golf courses and resorts has raised fears about a real-estate bubble. But Hainan is now too big and too prestigious for the Chinese to let fail.

In 2010 nearly 25 million tourists arrived,but only about 600,000 of them were from outside China. Beijing’s current effort is about drawing millions of international tourists into Hainan.

Pearl on the string

Hainan is not all about commerce. It has become as important as an element of China’s ambitious naval strategy. The island’s geostrategic importance,sitting astride Asia’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) was never in doubt.

When it occupied China,Japan developed the Yulin natural harbour on the island. As they focused on controlling internal turbulence and securing land frontiers,the Chinese Communists had little time for either naval strategy or Hainan in the early decades of ruling China.

All that has changed in recent years as a rising China turns to the sea. As Chinese leaders begin to devote policy energies to securing the nation’s maritime interests,Hainan has inevitably gained extraordinary strategic significance. The critical naval facilities being developed by Beijing are not too far from Sanya,on the southern tip of the island,where the BRICS summit is taking place. Some strategists see Hainan as the spearhead of Chinese maritime strategy in the South China Sea.

In lending credibility to its widespread territorial claims in the South China Sea,asserting sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone,and monitoring the SLOCs that form the lifeline of China’s globalised economy,Hainan Island has become critical for Beijing.

Hainan also is being developed as a home port for China’s nuclear submarines — the attack version as well as the boomers carrying nuclear tipped ballistic missiles. The Hainan base is central to Chinese ambitions to project maritime force into the Indian Ocean,where it has begun to acquire vital economic interests.

When the Indian strategic community focuses on the Chinese navy,it thinks of the “string of pearls”. Hainan is indeed the first pearl of the string that will facilitate Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Those in India who object to the Chinese string of pearls must,in fact,ask their own government what Delhi is doing to develop its own strategic island territories.

Territorial think

Both China and India are obsessed with territorial sovereignty,and their own bilateral relationship has been hobbled by a long and contested border along and across the Himalayas. But the two countries have had a very different approach to developing their strategic frontiers.

China has spent billions of dollars since the turn of the century to rapidly develop the internal and external connectivity in its sensitive border provinces — Xinjiang,Tibet and Yunnan. While India has woken up to the developments on the Chinese side of the border and has decided to modernise its own border infrastructure,progress has been pitiful. Even when there is recognition of a strategic imperative,Delhi’s will to implement seems terribly weak.

The situation is a lot worse when it comes to maritime territories. There is little awareness in the Indian political circles on how China has begun to develop its strategic islands. If Dr Singh does ask for a briefing on Hainan,he might discover an unflattering comparison to Delhi’s continuing neglect of India’s island territories — the Andaman and Nicobar chain to the east and Lakshadweep to the west.

Like Hainan,the Andamans and Lakshadweep occupy very strategic maritime locations,sitting close to the sea-lanes that connect the world. Over the last decade,Beijing has galloped towards the economic and strategic development of Hainan. But it seems rather difficult to get Delhi to focus on the strategic significance of the island territories.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research,Delhi