On September 3, the People’s Republic of China staged a 90-minute Victory Day parade in Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of Imperial Japan’s surrender in World War II. The event showcased formations from the army, navy, air force, joint logistics support force, rocket force, and the newly-raised aerospace force, along with a striking array of military hardware, some unveiled publicly for the first time.
Unlike the 2015 Victory Day parade, which featured about 1,000 troops from 17 foreign countries, this year’s spectacle was larger in scale but exclusively Chinese. President Xi Jinping opened the parade, stating that the world faces “a choice between peace and war” and calling on the PLA’s rank-and-file to “accelerate the building of a world-class military”.
The parade, attended by over 25 heads of state, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, and leaders from the Caucasus region, Central Asia, Africa, and ASEAN, comes at a time when the Donald Trump administration attempts to impose a new, albeit chaotic, world order. Trump took to Truth Social to wish Xi “a great and lasting day of celebration”, and asked if Xi would acknowledge the US contribution in World War II, and to convey his “warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un, as you conspire against the USA.”
The parade, conducted on Chang’an Avenue (“Eternal Peace Street” which leads onto Tiananmen Square), comes in the wake of military reform and modernisation efforts for the PLA. Since the overwhelming success of US-led wars in Kosovo and Iraq in 1991, the PRC’s Central Military Commission has periodically issued doctrinal guidance to steer reform. The stated objective: To build by 2049, in three phases, an integrated armed forces capable of conducting high-intensity, integrated, “informationised operations” in the shortest time possible across a range of missions, including those far away from China. Since then, the PLA has undergone the most rapid technological and doctrinal transformation of any military since World War II.
The parade showcased a large variety of weapon systems of two broad categories:
• Strategic/nuclear ‘triad’: This included the latest road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs; JL-3, a new, third-generation, intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missile for its Type-094A SSBN; JingLei-1, its first air-launched nuclear-capable ballistic missile; DF-17, which is equipped to carry a hypersonic glide vehicle; DF-26D, an anti-ship ballistic missile.
• Theatre counter-intervention systems/A2-AD: These included truck/ship-mounted lasers and directed-energy weapons for air defence; hypersonic glide vehicles; GJ-11 unmanned combat aerial vehicle; electronic jamming vehicles; cyber warfare outfits; FH-97 “loyal wingman” ‘stealth’ UAV for accompanying stealth fighters like J-20, J-35; AJX002, Unmanned underwater vehicles; PCL-191 high mobility artillery rocket system; J-15-DT, its new, carrier-based electronic warfare jet.
Further, in January this year, there were reports of China constructing a new military command centre at least 10 times the size of the Pentagon.
The weapons on display underscore that the PLA is not only catching up with the US military but is assiduously preparing for future warfare. It also counters the conventional Western narrative that China’s technological capacities accrue solely from intellectual properties stolen from the West and replicated by it. China is now a formidable leader in technological innovations spread across many domains, with an indigenous, well-integrated civil-military-industrial complex possessing a comprehensive capacity to sustain its military in an extended war.
The political message was two-fold: Given the proceedings of the recent SCO meeting and the attendance at the parade, it is apparent that China and Russia, along with some other countries, are trying to forge a new international order. China will no longer be “bullied” by the US or its allies, and the “century of humiliation” will not be repeated. While the US military may still be the strongest, China will close the gap further.
There are indicators, however, to suggest that China has no intention to use the transformed PLA to directly challenge the US military, at least not in the short- and medium-term. It hasn’t added any more overseas military bases to its strategic kitty after Djibouti (2017). While China has built a large Navy capable of limited “blue-water” operations, it still doesn’t have a comprehensive expeditionary capability, and doesn’t seem focused on building one. Its current fleet is insufficient for that role. Further, China hasn’t enacted any global military alliance like NATO.
Given the US’s expeditionary capabilities (11 carrier strike groups; three active amphibious ready groups), any China-US war will be fought in the Asia-Pacific theatre – and unless that war turns nuclear, CONUS (Continental United States) is likely to suffer far less damage than mainland China. The Communist Party is well aware that its legitimacy is linked to its ability to deliver continued prosperity to China’s citizens, and it’s unlikely to jeopardise that through a debilitating war. Its focus seems to be strengthening its posture “near abroad”, especially in the East and South China Seas.
The writer, a retired Army officer, was the principal director in the National Security Council Secretariat
