For an extremist movement whose core objective is the armed overthrow of the Indian state,the Maoists offer of a 72-day truce from February 25 to May 7 to New Delhi is tactically brilliant. The ceasefire move,coupled with a dialogue mediated by so-called intellectuals,is a counter to Home Minister P. Chidambarams offer to talk to Maoists if they abjured violence for 72 hours. However,the timing of the Maoist offer to smoke the peace pipe is significant and must be kept in mind by the internal security establishment of the country. Even if the Maoist offer is unconditional,a possible truce would come at a huge cost.
First,it comes at a time when the Maoist domination in the 220 districts,including 83 seriously affected ones,is being challenged by the security forces participating in the inter-state Operation Green Hunt. With due credit to the state governments,Gadchiroli in Maharashtra and the Kanker-Rajnandgaon tract of Chhattisgarh are expected to turn around the corner soon,paving the way for developmental works there.
Second,with Orissa Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik finally convinced that even his popularity among the electorate will not stop the Maoists,the stage is set for induction of four trained BSF battalions next week to launch operations to open the Koraput-Malkangiri-Dantewada axis. With logistics arranged and four thousand troopers on the standby,this operation could shrink the Maoist space. Even West Bengal CM Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee and Jharkhand CM Shibu Soren have hinted that they would assist Central forces in clearing up the Midnapore-Purulia-Panskura-West Singhbhum tract.
Third,the onset of monsoon in May in the densely forested Maoist strongholds in the eastern regions of the country will ensure that no security action is possible against the rebels till September this year. In case of a ceasefire,this would allow the extremists to regroup,rearm and consolidate their positions.
Fourth,with Bihar scheduled to go to polls this winter followed by West Bengal,the rebels and local politicians,as in the past,could buy tactical peace and move into these states post-monsoon. With only two Central force battalions involved in Lalgarh and both Nitish Kumar and Bhattacharjee pitted against the Congress,this is a distinct possibility. Further,the BJP,which shares power in Jharkhand and Bihar,could be forced by electoral compulsions to temper its anti-Naxal rhetoric.
Against this backdrop,a 72-day truce would translate into a year of consolidation for the left-wing extremists. It would,consequently,be a prolonged wait for the Central forces and during this period operational commanders,including Central Task Force Commander Vijay Raman,will either retire or be on the verge of retirement.
Of particular concern to the government,with or without the truce,are its developmental efforts,some Rs 7300 crore worth in the pipeline,in the affected states. Under the cover of high-sounding rhetoric,the rebels in the past have targeted 71 school buildings,73 gram panchayat bhavans,mobile towers and road building effort in the least developed and poorest of the poor areas of the country.
Either way,the Manmohan Singh government should impress upon states like Jharkhand,Bihar and West Bengal the need to step up efforts to train police personnel; particularly West Bengal,where the line between politician and law enforcer has been smudged in over 30 years of CPM rule. The prime minister and the home minister should sensitise ministers at the Centre and in the states on the nature of the Maoist movement. The point is,talk if you must but then have the political will to act against the left-wing rebels if the dialogue does not yield desired results.
The veneer of a mass proletariat movement cannot conceal the fact that Maoists have killed 1600 civilians and 800-odd security personnel in the past three years,and the only people apart from the rebels who use beheadings to assert their sway in the subcontinent these days are the Pakistani Taliban.
An indication of the lack of political will was evident from the tepid start to Operation Green Hunt after the Maharashtra and Jharkhand elections even though security forces were assembled and raring to go. It is only in this context that one can understand the political apprehensions of Nitish Kumar or Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee.
It is not only lack of political will but the hands-off approach by local police forces in Jharkhand,Orissa,West Bengal and Bihar that is hampering the security response to Maoists. Except for Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh,the other state governments actually want the Central forces to fight the Maoists and thus the demand for more paramilitary forces. Due to the personal efforts of Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh and Maharashtra Home Minister R.R. Patil there is synergy between Central troops and the local police. For instance,the paramilitary troopers and state police have optimised security to their camps in Gadchiroli by constructing fortifications adjacent to each other,and they share one meal each week to encourage camaraderie. In other states,the problem is not of resources but of inter-operability with the local police trying to please their political masters.
Were it to come through,the Centre should use the truce period to fine-tune its intelligence collection capabilities on Maoist groups. Operation Green Hunt has been inhibited by poor intelligence with each agency having its own set of priorities. A classic example is Maoist leader Kishenji,who has the temerity to call journalists on cell phones at random,but eludes the security agencies in times of advanced communication and signal intelligence.
The Manmohan Singh government in the end should see the present truce/ talks offer as a short-term tactic on the part of Maoists to attain their long-term goals. With Maoist sympathisers already softening the peripheries of many cities,the day is not very far when these rebels escalate their movement from jungle to urban warfare. Are we prepared for that?
shishir.gupta@expressindia.com
