On September 9, Israel mounted aerial strikes on a residential complex in a diplomatic area of Doha, the capital of Qatar. The complex housed the political office of Hamas where a meeting was in progress to discuss the US proposal on Gaza. The Hamas negotiators and leaders were not in the building which was targeted, but a few functionaries and a Qatari security officer were killed. Qatar affirmed that the Hamas office was functioning on the American request to facilitate dialogue. The next day, accusing Qatar of providing money and safe harbour to Hamas, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned of more strikes against Hamas’s “safe haven” in Qatar and elsewhere. Amid hostilities between two of the US’s closest allies in the region, the critical question is not what role the US played, but what options Qatar and the Arab states have.
After the expulsion of Hamas from Jordan around 1999, Syria accommodated the political office of Hamas in Damascus. As the Syrian revolution began to unfold in 2011, Hamas leaders started siding with Sunni rebels against the Assad regime. Under pressure, the political leaders of Hamas moved to Qatar and Egypt. Qatar publicly declared that on the US’s request, it had allowed the Hamas political office in Doha to keep channels of communication open. Qatar also accepted a US request to host Taliban representatives to facilitate intra-Afghan reconciliation and permitted the Taliban to open a political office in Doha in 2013. A trusted US ally, Qatar has visibly played a facilitator for talks with the Taliban and a mediator with Hamas for the release of Israeli hostages and a ceasefire in Gaza.
Qatar is home to the largest American military base in the region. A nerve centre of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the Al Udeid base oversees and defends US interests and that of allies in the region, including in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The over-the-horizon US counter-terrorism capability resides here too. Qatar is an indispensable logistical base for CENTCOM operations and in turn, a beneficiary of the US security umbrella. Any violation of Qatari air space would be a prime security concern for CENTCOM.
US officials have explained that the American military informed the White House about the strikes shortly before they happened, and this was conveyed to Qatar. In a call to the Qatari Emir, condemning the strikes and claiming no prior knowledge, Trump assured that there would be no repetition. However, by threatening Qatar the very next day, Netanyahu has publicly negated the assurance.
The Sunni Arab leadership, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strongly condemned the attacks. Most of these states also host US bases or troops. They have all more or less lived under the US security umbrella since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The top question for them must be whether the American protective umbrella was only against “potential” Iranian aggression. Will the Sunni Arab states rescind the Abraham Accords and similar instruments with Israel? With Israel playing a regional “super cop”, it remains to be seen how the Sunni Arab states can come together to force the US to contain Israeli aggression and/or look for other options over the mid- to long- term.
In sharp contrast, Iran went to war when it was attacked by Israel in June. The conflict lasted only 12 days and ended unconditionally. The US did pitch in to target three Iranian nuclear sites to destroy enriched uranium and facilities, a claim yet to be verified. However, Iran carried on with the war with Israel without taking any military help from its “proxies” like Hamas and Hezbollah.
Politically, the global condemnation of genocide in Gaza and the role played by Russia and China have nudged the Sunni Arab states and Iran to restore ties. The hostilities between the Saudi-led Arab states and Qatar too have melted in the last few years. The Israeli action is likely to further unite the region and may result in greater political and economic alignment with the Russia-China duo.
The international pressure on halting the war in Gaza and pursuing a two-state solution has never been as high on Israel as it is now. Following the recognition of the State of Palestine by several countries in the middle of the war in 2024, seven western countries, namely the UK, Australia, France, Belgium, Malta, Canada and Portugal, have pledged to do the same at the UN General Assembly in September. The UK too has set a few conditions. The US and Israel have condemned such pledges, but if actualised, they would lead to a near total political isolation of Israel and the US on Palestine.
A day after the Doha strikes, in a speech to the European Parliament, EU President Ursula von der Leyen spoke about proposals that would include sanctions against “extremist” Israeli ministers and partial suspension of trade-related matters with Israel. In 2024, the EU emerged as the biggest trading partner of Israel with trade in goods worth over €40 billion. The proposal would require the support of at least 15 members, which is not easy, but it would be a huge headache for Israel. The EU President also announced that a “Palestine Donor Group” will be set up next month, including an “instrument for Gaza reconstruction”. This is a signal that the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza is not acceptable to Europeans.
The question is whether Israel sabotaged the ceasefire and hostage negotiation to shift the focus of global actors and Sunni Arab states away from Gaza to managing Israel-Arab tensions. Or was it a maximum-pressure tactic to show Hamas that it would not be allowed “overground” existence if it did not accept Trump’s latest proposal? Or could it simply be a big miscalculation? The answer might emerge in the coming weeks and months amidst greater turbulence in the Middle East, with repercussions for global security and trade.
The writer is a security analyst and former director general of police
