As a South Asia specialist in the US state department, Dennis Kux’s acquaintance with India and Pakistan goes back to the 1950s. Author of books on America’s relations with the two countries (‘The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies’ and ‘India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1947-1991’), he is in India to research an article for the US Foreign Policy Association, called ‘Whither India’. Also in the works, he says, is a sequel to the India-US book. He spoke to Mini Kapoor about George W. Bush’s forthcoming visit to India and the importance of the July 18 nuclear agreement:
You have traced the improvement of relations between India and US to the May 1998 nuclear tests, saying that it lanced the boil and set the stage for the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks.
That was ironic and paradoxical. The fact that India tested meant that the US was no longer leaning on India not to test, and that put one phase of the problem behind. It did clear the way in a sense for the gradual improvement in relations that took place as a result of the talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott and Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. It has continued under the Bush administration across the board. And now the nuclear thing has come back. It is a little ironic as well that in a sense the July 18 agreement really responded to what India was asking for: on the one hand acceptance into the nuclear club, and on the other the lifting of the remaining bar on India’s participation in civil nuclear trade — in other words nuclear power and getting access to nuclear technology. But the devil is in the detail, they say.
As someone who has keenly studied America’s relations with India, would you say that if that agreement goes through, it would be a milestone?
Either way it would be a milestone. If it doesn’t go through, inevitably it will have its negative implications on the relationship. It seems to me both governments are to some extent at fault on handling this. The agreement was reached in July; only now six-seven months later are they following up to work the details out. Both sides can be blamed for moving too slowly, and therefore there may have been misunderstandings. With time opposition has developed. But having watched US-India relations over the years, I hope this opportunity is not missed.
How transparent is the deal?
What is being called for is pretty straightforward: the separation of civil and military installations in order to permit the new dispensation to go forward. The administration has to present something to the US Congress. If the Congress says that there is nothing here, then they may not do what Bush wants.
How significant was the IAEA vote on Iran in this context?
Well, it was not directly related, but it was one of those serendipitous things. It means different things in both countries. For the US one of the arguments for (the nuclear deal) is that India will be working together on non-proliferation. Say what you like about Iran, but the fact is that they kept cheating. So for India not to be part of the global consensus would have sent a negative signal. Over here (in India), of course, it gets all tied up in a variety of things: the Americans are dictating to us, etc. I think the prime minister has been wise. He has said, look, we will do what we think is in our interest in the given circumstances.
Would the United States be under pressure to balance this with a nuclear pact with Pakistan?
No, this is India only. They are trying to make an exception for India, period. This also underscores one of the things India has been trying to achieve, to dehyphenate from Pakistan. Well, this is dehyphenation. Pakistanis don’t like it but their record is terrible.
So would you say India and the US are estranged no longer?
They are moving towards whatI would call a normal relationship, big countries with similar systems. We now have stronger trade links. And this nuclear deal really removes the last barrier, which will enable us to have stronger security links. But if the deal falls through, the barrier is going to remain. There is no waiver authority which the administration could use. And if the Democrats come in, I doubt that they would change it. They are stronger on non-proliferation than the Republicans are.
How would you compare Bush’s visit with earlier presidential visits to India?
You have two visits he is not likely to surpass: Eisenhower’s and Clinton’s. Nixon’s visit he will surpass. Carter’s visit was overshadowed by the open mike and the nuclear problem. Hopefully this one won’t be.
But given that the last months have not been very good for America abroad, is Bush under pressure to get a foreign policy success?
I think so. That will be a pressure to try to work things out.