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Journalism of Courage
The Chinese foreign minister was in town. Many in India would, of course, like a better explanation of the perceived Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal at the NSG. While the National Security Advisor declared that India was “disappointed,” others less diplomatic have cried ‘betrayal,’ referring to earlier declarations by China that it “would not stand in the way.” In fact, very few in India seem to have actually trusted China or expected anything good of it in the deliberations, and there are many who feel vindicated now.
The key point here, however, is not the Chinese ‘betrayal’ but remembering what was achieved. The fact remains that the Chinese did not scuttle the deal themselves — something that was surely within their power to do. Yes, they appear to have encouraged others in the NSG to put paid to the deal, but that is also carrying the argument a bit too far. Surely, India also needed to address the views of smaller countries for their own merits, with or without Chinese support for them. India’s leaders did realise this and stuck to their task without wringing their hands about any attempted Chinese sabotage. India also had a job to do and it did it, despite the obituaries already being written back home.
Meanwhile, it is perhaps incorrect to say that China has made a strategic miscalculation by opposing India. It is notable that India’s external affairs minister sought to avoid comment by saying that “[this] is their internal matter.” The key word here is “internal.” Perhaps the minister is not unaware of the pulls within the Chinese establishment on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Like any country, China has its hawks and doves. One must understand that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) does not function like its counterparts in India or the US . Not only is the MOFA answerable to the Communist Party, the ministry can sometimes be in the dark, as to what the military establishment is up to and its views are in reality often also of secondary importance. It is likely there was a struggle within the highest levels of decision-making, and China’s powers-that-be probably decided that angering India a little was less of a problem than giving the view domestically that China had given the US and India (in that order) a walkover. Every action including China’s original declarations of support, Pakistan’s unhappiness, US pressure and Indian expectations, formed part of this larger tableau. It is, therefore, surely no coincidence that the Chinese foreign minister is in India at precisely this time, when he will be most required to douse inflamed views of his country.
And if China did attempt wholeheartedly to oppose the deal, it was aware that there would have been a price to pay, to mollify New Delhi. Even if the deal had not gotten through the NSG, China would have had to make up for it with concessions to India in other areas. This in itself would have been an achievement of these negotiations. Indeed, one can be sure that Beijing will extract its pound of flesh from Washington, perhaps on Iran and North Korea.
The Chinese foreign minister’s visit must not be an occasion for recrimination — India has made its point with its demarche — but for greater sophistication on India’s part. Having made their point domestically, the Chinese leadership will most likely be willing to make up for the events at the NSG and India must use this opportunity with grace. Asking for concessions on the boundary is perhaps asking for a bit too much but there are other demands that can be made. Opening up greater trade and tourist links across the disputed boundary can be easily done. In addition, both sides can agree to a better exchange of hydrological data on waters originating in Tibet, reducing visa restrictions, demarcating the Sikkim-Tibet boundary, and greater energy and civilian nuclear cooperation. These are just some of the possible items on a new bilateral agenda between India and China. The time now is to look forward, not back.
The writer is a research fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
