© The Indian Express Pvt Ltd
Tags:
Journalism of Courage
Exactly six months after former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s unceremonious ouster from Dhaka, a mob on February 5 razed to the ground the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum at Dhanmondi 32. The building had been previously torched by vandals last year, hours after Hasina’s exit on August 5.
Dhanmondi 32 was the residence of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of Bangladesh. It was from this house that Mujib led Bengali resistance against Pakistan throughout the 1960s till his arrest in 1971 — according to the museum’s website, Dhanmondi 32 “was the center of all of Bangabandhu’s political activities”.
And it was here that renegade officers of the Bangladesh Army murdered Bangabandhu, his wife, sons, and 10-year-old grandson. (Mujib’s daughters Hasina and Rehana survived as they were abroad at the time). In 1994, Hasina converted the building into a museum.
This makes Dhanmondi 32’s demolition a watershed moment in Bangladesh’s political history. But this is not the first time that anti-Hasina protesters have targeted Mujib’s legacy.
In the three years prior to his killing in 1975, Mujib attempted to reshape Bangladesh’s national character, and de-link it from Pakistani traditions. This included a concerted effort to ostracise those Bangladesh Army officers who did not participate in the Liberation War, and containing Islamist tendencies in both the polity and the military.
But there was pushback from some quarters that ultimately led to Mujib’s assassination and a military coup in 1975. General Ziaur Rahman took control — unofficially by late 1975, officially as President in 1977 — and undid many of Mujib’s policies. Notably, he gave more space (including Cabinet positions) to parties like Jamaat-e-Islami in mainstream politics. This continued under subsequent Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) governments of Ziaur’s wife Khaleda Zia in 1991-96 and 2001-06.
It is in this context that Hasina’s personal politics must be understood. After coming to power in 2009, Hasina clamped down on Islamist parties, ensuring that they are effectively removed from the electoral field. She also targeted alleged razakars (or collaborators with the Pakistani state) for their war crimes in 1971.
Beyond reflecting Bangabandhu’s political vision, the Awami League relied heavily on Mujib’s legacy to legitimise Hasina’s politics — which became increasingly controversial with each election since 2014. Much of what the Hasina administration did, good or bad, was in Mujib’s name.
This made protecting Mujib’s legacy of paramount importance. To this end, the Hasina administration passed laws like the Digital Security Act, 2018 whose Section 21 penalises “any propaganda or campaign against liberation war… Father of the nation [Bangabandhu]…” with imprisonment of upto 10 years, and a fine of upto 1 crore taka.
By February 2024, as anti-Hasina protests gathered steam, anything and everything linked to the PM — from her strong India tilt to her reliance on Mujib’s legacy — came under attack.
Hasina’s years-long clampdown on the opposition, including the arrest of Khaleda in 2018 and ban on BNP’s activities and publications in 2023, alleged corruption, and economic mismanagement had created significant resentment among the populace. When the resentment boiled over, the people of Bangladesh rejected the very basis of Hasina’s politics — an espousal of what she believed was authentic Bangladeshi nationalism based on the Awami League’s and Mujib’s role in the liberation struggle.
This is why Hasina’s use of the term razakar while criticising student protestors did not work. “Ami ke? Tumi ke? Razakar razakar [Who am I? Who are you? Razakar razakar],” they chanted, proudly owning what had long been seen as the most terrible biggest slur in Bangladesh politics.
Long suppressed fundamentalist and Islamists elements finding space in the protests ostensibly led by the Students Against Discrimination only made things worse. As protestors closed in on Hasina’s residence on August 5, Mujib’s statues were toppled and murals defaced.
Put simply, Bangladeshi reverence for Mujib as the founding father, was superseded by protestors’ revulsion for his daughter’s authoritarianism in his name.
What happened in Dhanmondi 32 in August was the result of anti-Hasina sentiments being extended to the instruments she used to sustain her rule. But its demolition last week was the product of a different process.
Over the last six months, the interim government has faced significant challenges, including questions regarding Muhammad Yunus’ own legitimacy as “Chief Advisor”, most notably from Hasina herself. To counter this, the Yunus government has mounted pressure on India — fresh friction at the border, diplomatic spats, unprecedented defense and intelligence ties between Dhaka and Rawalpindi, among other things — and more importantly, prosecuted Hasina legally, politically, and socially.
Institutions that Hasina had erected, such as the International Crimes Tribunal in 2010, have also been turned against her. The ICT was originally meant to investigate war crimes from 1971. But the tribunal now focuses on alleged crimes against humanity committed under Hasina’s rule, has issued several arrest warrants against her, banned the publication of her speeches, and is seeking an Interpol Red Notice.
A fresh and determined focus on undoing Mujib’s legacy — with all things associated with Mujib being characterised as symbols of “fascism” that must be removed — is a key part of the government’s strategy to legitimise itself, and sustain its rule.
This is best illustrated by the government cancelling eight Hasina-era national holidays linked to Mujib, including one on August 15, the anniversary of Mujib’s assassination. At the same time, the government allowed the celebration of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s 76th death anniversary at Dhaka’s National Press Club with Urdu songs and poetry, something that flies in the face of what Bangladesh’s struggle against West Pakistan’s linguistic and cultural imposition on Bengali Muslims stood for.
If the 2024 anti-Hasina protests targeted Hasina’s father, the latest developments are against the ‘Father of the Nation’. The strong downstream effect of the government’s moves is that extremists, the likes of whom destroyed Bangabandhu’s house, now get a free hand to target Mujib.
That this does not represent the entirety (or even a majority) of the views held by Bangladeshi people, was reflected in what Mahfuz Alam, editor of The Daily Star, wrote on October 18, 2024: “We cannot malign Bangabandhu’s historic and indisputable role with what Sheikh Hasina did in the 15-plus years she was in power.”
Unfortunately, much like the politics of revenge that Hasina herself perpetuated, the Yunus administration now benefits from a reciprocal focus on revenge. Bangabandhu’s legacy pays the price.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi.
Bantirani Patro is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.
