The editorial ‘Maoist reminder’ (IE, April 28) is in fact a “reminder” of the growing securitisation of the political discourse. It sounded more like a dossier of the NIA rather than an informed editorial that attempts to go to the root of the current impasse in central India and the ensuing spiral of violence between Maoist guerilla squads and security forces. The editorial unsuspectingly draws on many of the assumptions of the dominant narrative from a statist perspective. While the caution to follow the standard operating procedures is well-taken, it misses the woods for the trees in suggesting that more intelligence information or taking into account the challenges of the terrain would put an end to this problem.
The editorial is self-contradictory in, on the one hand, referring to the phenomenon as a “movement” and, on the other, evaluating its presence or impact purely in terms of its strike rate. The fact that the incidence of violence has come down is a relief but violence alone cannot exhaust understanding if something is a “movement”. We need a political understanding of its efficacy or growing irrelevance.
State forces have been narrating a rehearsed story of declining Maoist presence and claiming that the use of more force will finish its vestigial influence. This includes specially-trained forces such as the Greyhounds and extra-judicial experiments involving civilians such as the Salwa Judum, which the editorial notes did not help in “exterminating the movement”. As many studies have shown, the use of more force only helped the Maoists recruit from the local tribal population. The Maoist movement moved from the leadership of outsiders (mostly from Telangana) to that of local tribals. Such internal changes often lead to local support among the tribals in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. The efficacy of the movement needs to be gauged in terms of its declining social base, not on the basis of how many violent incidents occur. Such an evaluation often ends up giving the wrong picture because it could well be a political strategy of the Maoists to go silent. The wrong assessment could also lead to lapses on the part of the security forces.
The editorial finally refers to the role of state reach, governance, welfare and development as part of the “strategy” to mellow down and make the Maoists irrelevant. Again, it papers over the complexities of what is happening in central India. It borrows from the dominant narrative of development. Is the idea of development helping the state gain control and legitimacy or is it helping the Maoists gain a foothold?
The D Bandyopadhyay Committee, set up by the Planning Commission in 2006, stated in its report that land alienation and poverty among Scheduled Tribes and Dalits, and lack of access to basic forest resources contributed to the growth of Naxalism. The question is whether the state’s idea of development addresses these concerns. The state’s model of development has resulted in the displacement of tribals. The adverse impact of “development” also led to peaceful protests such as the Pathalgarhi movement in Jharkhand, where the tribals proclaimed sovereignty over resources in the areas they have inhabited for centuries. Most governments, irrespective of the political party in power, have a similar approach of imposing a certain idea of development that may not go down well with the tribals. Under the Congress regime, similar attempts were made by invoking the Eminent Domain doctrine, arguing that all resources belong to the nation and can be extracted in the “national interest”.
The problem gets further complicated because the Maoists too have a simplistic understanding of the situation and do not have solutions to the new aspirations and generational shifts. Sections of tribals desire modern development, including access to modern infrastructure, roads, transport, schools and hospitals. Such a section may not want to live off natural resources and continue with age-old practices. Development being seen as a zero-sum game by either side leads to a stalemate. The editorial correctly notes that the “Maoist movement has hollowed out as a political project” precisely because of their inability to understand various shades, the multiplicity of demands and growing social differentiation among the tribals. It can also be asked why tribals should be the fodder for a political vision of takeover of state power by the Maoists. Also, as civil rights activist K Balagopal noted, the Maoists, who claim to represent the poor, seem to end up killing more of this social base when they target jawans and tribals for being “informants”.
The social question of exclusion cannot be understood either through the securitisation paradigm or through a singular focus on violence and overthrow of state power. If there was one thing common between Ambedkar and Gandhi, it was their steadfast position that matters of social exclusion and caste cannot be addressed through violence. Both remained champions of non-violence and constitutional means. In all this, we miss the point of how we address multiple and sometimes contradictory demands of subaltern groups that cannot be brought together under a single idea of development or even welfare.
The writer teaches political science at JNU. His most recent book is Politics, Ethics and Emotions in ‘New India’
