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Journalism of Courage
Yet another clash has taken place between Indian and Chinese soldiers, this time in the Eastern Sector, where fortunately there was no loss of human life on either side. Whenever such incidents take place, for lack of authentic information, ill-informed opinions are generated in the media by half-baked “experts”, often depending on their political leanings or for extraneous considerations. The present incident is no exception and has generated its share of writings and TV discussions.
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The central point of the dispute is the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and China comes in for severe criticism for violation of the so-called LAC, which neither exists on the ground nor on any map — and not even on a piece of paper. It is essentially a line of perception, which both countries hold sacrosanct for their own reasons.
As China announced a ceasefire in November 1962, it had suggested the setting up of an agreed demilitarised zone and check-posts at agreed points along the ceasefire line to avoid any future misunderstandings on the border. India’s then Prime Minister, however, did not accept the suggestion, and the problem on the border continues to exist. If China’s offer had been accepted, it is possible that some agreed line would have emerged as a Line of Actual Control.
The non-aligned countries led by the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Sirimavo Bandaranaike, along with the representatives of some other non-aligned countries, made efforts to bring the two countries to the negotiating table. But the efforts did not bear fruit, and the problem remained unresolved. The situation on the border remained fluid, which left scope for such incidents.
The 1996 agreement on confidence building
In 1996 the two countries signed an important agreement on ‘Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas’. The first nine articles define a series of measures which both countries would take or not take towards ‘confidence building’ along the LAC. But Article X is crucial for the operation of the first nine articles. It said:
“Recognising that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the Line of Actual Control in India-China border areas, the two sides agree to speed up the process of clarification and confirmation on the Line of Actual Control…”
Both countries also agreed to exchange maps indicating their respective perception of the entire alignment of the Line of Actual Control.
In the last quarter century, the two countries have failed to define the all-important LAC required to implement the agreement. This failure stands as a testimony to the lack of confidence between them.
It is the absence of this line that lies at the heart of the problem. Despite several round of talks at various levels including the highest level, the two countries remain at loggerheads, and the border problem continues to bedevil their relations.
The Sikkim-Tibet border which was delimited in 1896 and is well defined and recognised by both countries had one snag — China had not accepted the 1975 merger of Sikkim with the Indian Union. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee deserves kudos for making China tacitly accept Sikkim as part of India during his 2003 visit to Beijing. This has helped in preventing any border incident on the Sikkim-Tibet border where the border is firmly delimited.
Needed: Courage to look at old problems honestly
Successive governments, with the exception of Vajpayee’s government, chose to follow the position taken by Jawaharlal Nehru, which had led to the 1962 war in the first place. Several opportunities to resolve the dispute were squandered. The offer made by China for a settlement on a quid pro quo basis in 1960, which was repeated in 1980 when Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister, were allowed to slip. Since 2014, the present government too has chosen to remain wedded to the old narrative, and has declared the recovery of lost territories as the cornerstone of its China policy.
What is required is a complete departure from the past and a fresh look at the old policies to come to an independent assessment. A fresh attempt at settlement must be made by give-and-take at the negotiating table. It is evident in such a scenario that India would have to make concessions at some places which were never in its possession, or where its ownership is nominal or tenuous.
The inherent problem with this approach is that it would create controversy — and some elements will look for an opportunity to accuse the government of “surrender” and of gifting away Indian territory.
The challenge is tough, but it is within the realm of possibility. It needs determination. If the resolution of this more than six-decade-old problem is to be found, the bull has to be taken by the horns.
Educating the public and creating an informed opinion are the only feasible options to resolve the issue. It is essential that the archives since independence are unshackled and people have access to them to search for some basic truth about the past, which would help them to understand the problem. Half-baked measures like a partial opening of the archives will only make people suspicious.
A S Bhasin is the author of ‘Nehru, Tibet and China’, published in 2021 by Penguin. In 2018, he edited and published a Five-Volume Documentary Study of India-China Relations: 1947-2000.
