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Journalism of Courage
Back in 2000, following a meeting with Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban envoy to Pakistan, Vijay K Nambiar, India’s High Commissioner to Islamabad at the time, assessed the chances of engagement with the regime in Kabul as bleak.
“I realised that there was no way in which we (Taliban and India) are going to be truly connected with each other in any kind of an understanding,” he said, according to Avinash Paliwal’s book, My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan, from the Soviet Invasion to the US withdrawal (2017). Nambiar believed that the Taliban were firmly in the “Pakistani circle of reasoning”, which made it difficult for India to seriously engage with them.
A quarter century later, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri last week led a delegation of senior Indian diplomats at a substantive meeting in Dubai with Amir Khan Muttaqi, Foreign Minister of the second Taliban regime.
The meeting was the culmination of the incremental progress of India’s “cautious engagement” with the Taliban who took power in Kabul after the Ashraf Ghani government collapsed three and a half years ago. How has India negotiated its relationship with the Taliban since they took power?
On August 31, 2021, hours after the last US military aircraft left Afghanistan, India made its first official contact with the Taliban – at the request of the new rulers in Kabul, Ambassador to Qatar Deepak Mittal met Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, head of the Taliban political office in Doha, at the Indian embassy. A few days before the meeting, Stanekzai, an alumnus of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun who would become Deputy Foreign Minister in the Taliban government, had said India was “very important for this subcontinent”, and the Taliban wanted to continue “cultural”, “economic”, “political”, and “trade ties” with India “like in the past”.
Days after the Doha meeting, then Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla said the engagement had been “limited”, and the Taliban had indicated they would be “reasonable” in the way they “handle” India’s concerns.
After the Taliban announced a Cabinet with very little representation for ethnic minorities and without any woman, India called for an “inclusive dispens ation”. As an “immediate neighbour and a friend to [the Afghan] people”, the situation was of “direct concern” to India, New Delhi said. Days earlier, then ISI chief Gen Faiz Hameed had travelled to Kabul to guide the Taliban in their appointments.
That September, India described the Taliban as “those in positions of power and authority across Afghanistan”, acknowledging the group as a state actor for the first time.
In December 2021, India sent 1.6 tonnes of essential medicines to Afghanistan, signalling a political call taken in New Delhi to see the ruling regime separate from the people of Afghanistan, while also opening a window to engage with the Taliban.
In early June 2022, an official Indian delegation visited Kabul for the first time after the Taliban takeover to oversee, according to the Indian government, “delivery operations of our humanitarian assistance” to Afghanistan. The team led by J P Singh, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, met Foreign Minister Muttaqi.
Later that same month, New Delhi sent aid for the Afghan people impacted by a deadly earthquake in the Khost and Paktika provinces in the east of the country, and also took the incremental step of stationing a “technical team” at the embassy in Kabul to coordinate the delivery of aid. The embassy had been evacuated following the Taliban takeover.
In December 2022, India expressed concern over the banning of women from universities, and renewed its call for an inclusive government that ensures equal rights for women and girls in all aspects of Afghan society. The MEA spokesperson referred to UN Security Council Resolution 2593, adopted on August 30, 2021 under India’s presidency, which talked about the need to uphold human rights and women’s rights, and sought a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan.
In October 2023, the Afghan embassy in New Delhi ceased operations citing paucity of resources and personnel, and the failure to “meet expectations…to serve the best interests of Afghanistan”. After the Ambassador appointed by the Ashraf Ghani government relinquished control, two Afghan diplomats posted in Mumbai and Hyderabad volunteered to run the mission.
In January 2024, Indian diplomats based in Kabul had their first publicised meeting with Muttaqi.
In their conversations with key Taliban leaders, Indian officials have got the sense that the Taliban are “ready to engage”, and are looking for assistance to rebuild the country’s infrastructure. They are also facing challenges in governance and capacity, as many trained Afghans have left the country.
On its part, New Delhi would not like to be left behind other countries, including China, who are making significant inroads in Afghanistan. While questions have been asked over India not linking its increasing engagement with a push for improving the situation of women in Afghanistan, New Delhi has said it is committed to the welfare of the people of that country, and would act in a “realistic manner”.
The regional and global context has been highly dynamic since the Taliban came to power. Afghanistan’s neighbour Iran has been weakened considerably, Russia is fighting its own war, and the US awaits the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
The Taliban’s benefactor and ally, Pakistan, has turned into a deadly adversary, having carried out at least three bombing raids inside Afghanistan since 2021, and pushed back large numbers of Afghan refugees across the Durand Line.
India, which has been watching the state of play, has concluded that this is the time to upgrade the level of official engagement — if it is to not lose its years of investment in Afghanistan. India’s core concern remains security — to ensure that no anti-India terrorist group is allowed to operate from Afghan territory.
India has dispatched large quantities of humanitarian, medical, and food aid to Afghanistan, and discussed the rehabilitation of refugees and strengthening of cricket ties.
In his meeting with Misri, Muttaqi asked India to issue visas to Afghan businessmen, patients, and students. However, this is complicated: India does not officially recognise the Taliban government, there are security threat perceptions, and there is no functional visa section at the Indian embassy in Kabul. But New Delhi is willing to consider going ahead with stalled projects in all 34 provinces – and this is an important commitment.
